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65At thLe time of tlhe enlargement of the Community the Comrnission
wish,:d to have a study made of the effects of Conrmunity  poJ.icy
since 1958 on the economies  of Member States and of the Com-
muni.ty as a whole.
This task was lgiven to Mt Pie:rte N4aillet, at that time t)irector
in tlLe Directo:rate-(]eneral of Budgets and now Ptofesseur at
Lille I University, rvho was actively helped by the cooperation
of cettun Connmission  olficials, particularly Messrs G. Hipp,
Ph. Gdmonpont and G. Malet, Miss M. Lambein,  Arlrs A.
Tibe:rghien, ancl also by the senrices of the Commission.
\7hen this detailed study was completed it became the subiect
of a comptehensive  report which was forwarded  t,o the Comrnis-
sion in January 1.973. Writhout necessatily endorsing all the
opin ions expres sed thetein, the Commission neverttreless consiclers
it useful to bring ttris report to the attention of a widet pulblic
by including it among its official publications.Introduction
The purpose of this report is to analyse the effects of Community
policy on the economies  of membet countries and on the Commu-
nity as a whole in the period 1.958-70.
The wotk has been delibetately angled on an assessment of the
degree to which the Treaty objectives have been fulfilled (despite
the genetal and unquantified terms in which they arc formulated);
on an analysis of the effects of Community action; and on the
Communjty's  capacity to deal w-ith the big problems it has encoun-
tered during its fifteen years' existence.
There wete two possible approaches to this task. One would
consist in a review of the various policies cattied out by the
Community Institutions.  This seemed to us to have two disadvan-
tages. On the one hand it would present a sectionalized  picture of
Community activities, whereas it often happens that several
policies converge to the same end. Moreover, these policies are
fully analysed each yeat in the Genetal Repot, and also from time
to time in genetal documents compiled by the responsible Direc-
torates-Genetal.
We considered that there would be greater utility and novelty in
giving as succinct as possible a general survey of the past fifteen
years. For this reason the procedure finally adopted was to sum-
marize this development under four main heads  :
(i) development of ptoduction structures, under the infuence
both of the dismantling of obstacles to the movement of
goods and of other factors of production, and by measuresof a more directional  chara,cter (competition policy anrl inrlus-
trial polic,g);
(ii) developm,3nt of incomes,  standards of living and usr: of'the
national ptodur:t. This is t freId in which direct Community
intetvention is more limited; but in the " acceletateil raising
of the standatcl of living "' we 
^te 
dealing with one of the
basic objectives of the fotmation of the Community;
(iii) the steadiness  of the rate of growth, in terms alike of teg;ula-
rity in businessi  conditionsr, stabiliry in pticesi and thLe rrLain-
tenance of full employment. This is a field in v'hich the
Community's responsibility is fundamental;,
(iv) the Comrnunity's contribution to the creatjon of a wotld
economic order. Here, too, the Community''s tesponsibility
is very impottlrnt,  as also are the potential  rrleans o'f action
open to it. through its international ttading status.
These are the fbur s'potlights under which it is proposed tc, anerlyse
the Common  X{ark.et's fifteen yeats of existence. The four key
chapters will be preceded by a short preliminary chapter., indica-
ting the main .features of this ilevelopment,  and a second chapter
posing a queslion rvhich may seem naive, or even subversive *
is there indeed a common matket?
The period undet rliscussion runs ftom 1958 up to the pre:sent
time; but, for lach of mote recent statistics, the figutes will
seldom be given bel'6n6 7971., zndin some cases 1970. The picture
it is aimed to ptesent is a generalfresco  rather than a chron.ological
r€co,rd of events; but the teadet will quickly appreciate that the
14 or 15 years concerned fall into two petiods -- 8 or 10 y'eats
marked by the cteat:ion of a common matket, in confotmity 'with
precisely  predetetmined  ptocedures and time-tables ; and a sec,lnd,
shortet pedod in which the Cornmunity, faced with new plobl:ms,
has been progressively  obliged to define new objer:tives and tasks.
The exploratory work in this second period has taken ar certain
6time and during the last two years has called forth a considerable
variety of proposals and several important  decisions which are,
however, too recent for their effects to be seen in the concrete
data at our disposal.l
I It is obvious that such a report as the present one is not exhaustive. In particular,
we have abstained from touching-.upon-tiore  fields, such as agriculrure-or'.on"rury
questions,_concern_ing  which studies exist or are in preparution (for instance,  thl
Mansholt Plan and the Report of the Monetary  Commitiee).
7-8CHAPTER I
A few pointers
Before u/e attempt a detailed analysis of the various questions, there are
a number of indicators  by which we can make a preliminary  assessment
of the degree to which the main objectives of production, consumption,
external tade, employment and prices have in fact been reached.
Between 1958 and '1970, the Community's grorr national product at
constant prices rose by 90 Vo, equivalent to an average annual growth rate
o15.77o.  This is somewhat higher than the rate in the years before 1958,
especially in Belgium and the Netherlands.
The increase in the active population played only a small part in this
growth. Total employment  increased  only by 0.57o, but the GNP per
employed person rose by 5.27o ,  This was due to a substantial scale of
investment (the investment  ratio, excluding housing,  rose from 16.4 n
t958-59 to 19.2 in 1969-70); use of the results of. a rapidly growing research
effort; a speed-up  in the introduction of new products and processes; and
the redistribution  of manpower  into the most productive industries and
firms ( the shrinkage in the population engaged in agriculture would more
or less account for a growth of. 0.57o per annum).
It is impossible to give scientific proof that this rapid and sustained
growth is due to the formation  of the common market, or that the member
countries would not have been able to show an equally rapid expansion
if they had taken some other course. The figures show, nevertheless, that
since 1958 growth has been at least as fast as it was formerly, and more
rapid than in any other industrial  country except Japan, Moreover, all
the partial (and often qualitative) indications available give the impression
that at the decision-making  level, be it public or private, the formation of
the Community  has been a stimulus  alike to investment, to technical and
economic  innovation, and to various juridical reorganizations. There are
thus very cleat pointers to the presumption of a causal relationship. Thequestion  arises, horr,'ever, of whethci the potentialities  inlrerent in the <ieep-
seated changes embodied in the signing of the Rome Treaties have indeed
been exploited to the full.  This point will be consiclered in the next
chapter.
Tlre growth in production  has been. associated with a growth in 1>er capita
irucomes and. consumpt'ion. Allowing  for the l27o increase in Community
popurlation, the growth in GNP per inhabitant \Mas 69tVo, or zl.J/ct per
annum.  The figures lbl the GNP per head, converted iinto dollars at the
cuftent rate of e,xchange,  put the Comrnunity  counffies  among the richest
countries in the, wodd. The figures for the three leading Community
countries are no'w surpassed  only t,y the United States, tCanada,.Australia,
Sweden and Switzerland.
There has been 
'r 
certain tendency :for the gap between the different t3om-
munity countrieri to grow smaller, with the Nethedandsr coming cJ.oser to
the general Community  level, whil,r France's lead is dec.reasing. In "[taly,
how,:ver,  the ar;'erage level is still considerably lower, and the approach
to thLe levels of the othr:r counries  is' exffemely slow. At the rate of advance
reconded  between 1958 and 1970,it will take Italy a century to catch up
v,'ith the others. But the Italian l:vel is of comparatively small statistical
significance,  becrause c'{ the difference between the northern and southern
part of the country. In Lombardy, the GNP per head ir; very close t,c the
Community level, and the combined  figures for northern and central .[taly,
which contain t'ro-thirds of the co,unuy's population, is only 20%io ttelow
the avetage. kL the south, howel'er, the level shown ljor the 19 million
inhabitants  is barely  .45 Vo of the average, and in the last 12 'yearsi this
gap has shown practicaliy no tendency to grow narrowejr.
The fact that investmrent has increased  somewhat more rapidly than the
GNP has led to the a\/erage consurnption  per head being rather lower than
the lgrowth in the G\trP per head. The average annual increase is 4.37o.
These {igures telll of a very considerable  rise in tle stanclard of living; but
the GNP as an indicator is only rr first approach, and is not €:nough in
itselt. For this reason additional information,  angled on the c,f,ncept  of
expa.nding  consumption, is given inL Chapter 4.
The opening of the Common Market-and  even the announcement  of its
impr:nding formation--led to a rapid increase in intra-Comnunity  t'rade.
Betri'een 1958 aLnd 19)70 trade bet;ween tlre member counmies rnultiplied
in volume by 5;.7, arLd external tade by 2.5. The n:al jump in trade
between the member countries began in 1961, that is to say rv,ell before
tl-re complete dismantJling of customs barriers. This broadening of intra-
10Community trade did not lead to any falling-off in the growth of trade
with the rest of the vrorld. The annual growth of exports to non-member
countries averaged 6.7 Vo in 1951-58 and reached 9.3 Vo in 1959-70.
In the same two periods the corresponding figures for intra-Community
trade rvere 9.t7o and t6.4%o. The phenomena of specialization  associated
with this increase in trade are analysed in Chapter 3, and the equilibrium
in the balance o{ payments (with the cunent transactions accounts with
outside countries showing a consistent surplus) is described in Chapter  6.
As tegards the target of full eraployrnent, it is noted that the unemployment
rate for the Community as a whole came down quite quickly ftom3.47o
in 1958 to 2.17o in 1960 and 1.47o in 1964, subsequently oscillating
between 1.77o and 2.37o. It  has thus been possible to keep within
reasonable limits the impact of structural changes and fTuctuations  in
economic conditions on the employment situation.
The same cannot be said, however, about the target of general price
stability, at any rate during the last few years. The price index of the
gross domestic  product shou'ed a tise during the first five year:s at annual
rates of between 1.27o and 4.5%o, according to the country concerned
( or between  1.2 a,,(; and 3 .5 Vo if France is excluded  ) .  Later, during the next
5 years, the rise was kept between 2.5%o and 57o (or between 2.57o and
4Vo if the Netherlands  is excluded) .  In 1969 and the two following years,
however, the rates of increase exceeded  57o in all the countries, and have
risen still further since; and even though this phenomenon was not peculiar
to the Community, it is nevertheless disquieting.
In conclusioo,  contrary to urhat one vzonrld expect o{ a.n economic  union,
the changes in the rates ot' excbange  between  member  countries have been
substantial. Visi-uis  the European  Communities' unit of account, betv/een
1958 and 197 | the vaiue of the Deutschmark  rose by 20Vo , the Dutch guil-
der by 7oh and, the Belgian frcnc and the Italian lita bv 2.8Vo, while the
French franc depreciatedby lloio. These changes, and the sharp difference
betrveen  them lead, in Chapter 2, to our next question of horv far the
Communitv can vet be said to be ir unified economic area.
1,1CHA.PTER 2
i,s the Cornmunitv a unified econornic atea vet ?
JJ
The Community has b,een in the cc,urse of forrnation  for fifteen 1'eats, and
it is thus natural to arsk how fat it has really become a unified economic
^rea. 
The reply to such a question  may be sought, either in an examination
of the extent tc' which it has ful{illed the theoretical  r:onditions fo:r the
formLation of sur:h an atea or in the observation of economic behav'iour.
The question will be approached srLrccessively from these two angles.
1. Condi.ti.ons for tbe forrnation  6,f a unilied economic: area
By ar unified economic  area, we mean one within which decisions  on the
purchase of goocls and services,  and decisions on the location of production
units, ate taken withc,ut the choicc, respectively, of the source of supply
or tlhe site of the pr,cduction  unirt being influenced  b1' the existenr:e of
political frontiet's and economic disparities other than those which may
have arisen through  geogtaphical conditions and the legacy o1[ hisitory,
esper:ially  as regards the state of infrastructures.
The conditions for the formation of such an atea are specified in the
Trcaty, notably in Parrt Two and in Title I (Common Rules) of Part Three.
The extent to 'qrhich these conditions have been fulfilled can be sum-
n-rarized  as follc'ws.  i
Tari:ff obstacles to thr3 flovem€nt of goods have been wholly elitninated
since 1 July 1968, at the same time as the entry into for,ce of the Common
Custorns Tafif .  There are, however, still a number of n,on-tariff  ,obstacles;
and the tasks of completing the creation of the cnstoms union thrls remain
to be tackled, {'or exrrmple in elinninating the last of the charges having
an effect equivalent  to customs  dtrties and the approxirnation  o:[ customs
legislation.  Moreover,  though work is being actively pushed forwand  on
the general programme for eliminating the technical  rcbstacles  to trade
which result from dir;parities betu'een the laws, regulations and adrninis-
1,2trative provisions  of member countries, this work is still far from com-
pletion. Ii seems indeed that, except in special cases, these disparities do
not create serious obstacles. Nevertheless, they raise production  costs
and lead to economic  waste which is all the more regrettable because  in
most cases there is no real feason for their existence.
In regard to public procurement and works contracts, it was laid down in
the Treaty that, after the period of transition, any discrimination  would
be illegal. A recent communication  by the Commission  to the Council has
indicated that the present  state of things is far from being in line vrith the
Treaty provisions.  Though considerable  progress is expected  before long
in regard to normal supply contracts, it is otherwise with capital goods
and for advanced-technology ptoducts. Intra-community uade under these
heads is, in most cases, small or even insignificant, for example in the
case of electric power stations and telecommunications equipment.  Ad-
mittedly the volume of the trade is a poor indicator, for cross-frontier
trade is not an end in itself but only one method among others for im-
proving the efficiency of the economic system. It is only by concrete
case-by-case analysis that the usefulness of throwing  open public tenders,
and the me4sures  which need to be taken to achieve that, can be assessed.
There are, however, many indications that the potential  gains might be
substantial, and should therefore be sought.
It is also clear that the existence of a fiscal cordon at the national frontiers
temains as a definite, not merely psychological,  obstacle to the free move-
ment of goods. In fact it was not till I  January L973 that the VAT
system was finally brought into force in all six member countries.  The
creation of a uniform  basis for it still raises a number of problems; and
the harmonization of the rates of the tax runs into very great difficulties-
some of which are political, for the effect would be to curtail drastically
each government's autonomy in determining its tax receipts and therefore
its public expenditure. In the case of other taxes the legislations  have
been brought closer together, but they still show substantial differences.
Transport policy has always been considered an instrument which was
capable of considerably influencing the location of production  and trade
in goods. For this reason a special chapter was devoted to it both in the
Trcaty of Paris and in the Treaty of Rome. For the ECSC the great
achievement was the elimination  of 'load-breaking' at the national frontiers,
through the fixing of cross-frontier  through-rates.  This Decision was of
fundamental  importance in enabling coal and steel ptoducts to circulate
freely throughout  Community  territory. For the EEC no decision of
similar scope has been taken, because it has not yet been possible to
73introduce in the differrent coLlnries common conceptions  of rate-fixirrg,  in
which the initiall practice 'was very divergent.
The last two points ,considered have their influence, troth on trade and
on decisions  for indusftial location. There are, however, othet factors
which prevent firms ftom basing the choice of their sites errtirely  on
considerations  of t}e best use of the factors of production for the Com-
munity as a whole. 'Ihere are, for example,  still obstar:les  to freedo,m of
estal5lishment inL various occllpations, especially  finance houses zrntl insur-
ance, foi -,r'hich the national mad<ets are stili as watr:rtight in their division
as they were in 1958. Another  {ractor is the absence ,of a legal form, a
statlrte, for a '.European' compan'y,  and yet another ir; the existeri,c€ of
various types ofr regio'nal aid. In this matter the objer:tive of r:orrecting
socierl disequilibria, which dominated the pictufe at the outset,has graclually
been, supplemented  blr a desire to, secure the best use of the liactom of
prodluction  in th.e Community  as a whole. Both the verdicts on aid ,given
on a national bar;is anc[ the general Community orientations are increasiingly
modvated by the wish to channel the location of business, so as to streng-
then the efficiency of the Community's  economy. r$folk is novr in hand
on an analysis of the factors whir:h determine  the choice of lcrcation of
undetakings, arLd it is only when this is completed  that it will b,: por;sible
to saLy how far the actual trocation trends differ from the social and economic
optirnum for the whole Commulritl'.
In conclusion it is har:dly necessary'  to add that we cannot speak of a real
comrnon  econouric  sysitem so long as the rates of exchange between  the
countries are lialble to substantial  periodic adjustments such as those men-
tiontd in Chaptet 1. Business firms cannot be asked to behave as th:ough
they were working in a single unified market so long; as they' har,re to
ptepare for the risk--and cover themselves  against it-of  chanp;es in the
rates of exchange  betrveen the mernber counfties. It is this which makes
the prol'ects for fixed exchange rates (of a single currency unit) so irnpor-
tant; but it also gives cause for fealing that the slow progress-51l1ns1imss,
inder:d, regtess--alonp; the path towards monetary union may produce  a
lasti:rg setback in the pfocess of persuading business executives to see
thinl;s from the European viewpoint.
2. E' cononic beibauioar
The acid test for a truly unified economic  area is tfie existence thLroughout
it of a'single price system'. This does not mean that the pricers for
similar products sold in similar conditions (in the same quantitir:s, on the
74same credit terms, with the same after-sales service, etc. )  should be
identical throughout the teritory, but that the differences should arise
only from factors independent of the behaviour of buyers and sellers such
as tfanspoft  costs and tax disparities.
A price system on these lines does indeed exist for most classes of agricui-
tural produce, for this has been laid down under Decisions taken in the
Community Institutions. It  also exists, at least approximately,  fot the
products of the iron and steel indusuy, in regard to which the Commission
is careful in supervising the observance of Article 60 of the ECSC Treaty.
For other goods and setvices, ho,irrever,  there is no governing article
equivalent to ECSC Article 60, and there is no otganized publication of
price schedules. We are therefore in the thoroughly regrettable position
oI having no comparable  information  on producers' prices in the vatious
member countries. At Community level sutveys have been carried out
on harmonized lines, but they relate only to retail ptices.
An anaiysis of the most recent survey, contained in the first report on
competition policy, brings out the fact that the price gaps between the
collntries differ considerably  from product to product,  but are seldom less
than l07o and may be as much as 807o or mote. The e{fect of. tax
charges on these gaps again varies from one product to another; but though
the cii{ferences  between the untaxed prices are less wide than those between
the tax-inclusive prices, they are nevertheless  considerable. It would be
extremely interesting to know whethet these gaps arise in the disribution
systems or whether they are aheady there when the goods leave the
producer; but on this point the information is virtually non-existent.  The
only product for which information is available is the motor vehicle; and
this shows that the producers still fix materially different  prices in the
different Community  countries.
Information  of a qualitative charactet coming from business firms gives a
very clear impression that fot many products  producers regard the Com-
munity market as being still a long way from homogeneity. There are
various reasons for this--disparities in technical rules, which call for
product adjustment and may result in rises in costs; and these, combined
with fiscal differences, strengthen the impression of variety, and do not
encourage  people to regard the Community area as a real common matket.
The biggest source of heterogeneity, however, is the buyer, whether he
is a ptivate consumef or an adminisffation.  As regards the latter, the
persistent  compartmentalizing of public tenders has already been described.
As regards the private consumer, the differences  of taste and requirements
15are still such that a number of firms which, around 1960, had amanged
theit marketing  on the basis of a single department for the whole ,Com-
munity reconstructed  them yet aigain a few years later, with sep4141s
depa.rtments  for individual  countrir:s, so as to be able to deal better vrith
the national peculiarities of each :market. In this respect the European
market differs r:onsiderably  from the American, even though irhe latter
sho'ors quite appreciable taste differences between the ,:ast and the west
coast. The diversity may well persist; if it comes to that, it is o,ne cf the
peculiar characteristics and cultural  assets of Europe.
Thele are thus rnany factors which prevent this economic area from treing,
as yet, completely homogeneous. At present their real scope cannot be
defined; and since experience has shown that it is <lifficult to mrake quick
progress on every front, it would be useful to institute a wide-scale cc,nsul-
tation in order to assess the degree of hindrance engerrdered b,r eac-h of
thesr: obstacles and thus to redefine the order of urgency for the lines of
action still to be put in hand.
In any case, it should be borne in mind, in reading the rest of this r,eport
(ani[ especially Chapters 3 and4), that the changes notr:d durinE; the past
L5 years took pJace in a Community in which the dismantling  of obstacles
and the measures  of harmonization laid down in the T'reaty had not yet
takern place in their entirety, and 'uirhere there is therefo:re still a potential
for futther deveilopment which wil1 produce yet more changes in the near,
or fairly near, future.
T6CHAPTER 3
Developrnent of production structures
It was the intention of the fathers of the Common Market that it should
lead both to an increase in trade and to a transformation  of production
structures.  Increased  specialization  was to lead to lower costs of produc-
tion, and pethaps some degtee of combination would make it possible to
get full advantage from economies of size.
\(hat do the available  statistics tell us about this ?  How can we explain
what has actually taken place? How far have tlre targets  been attained?
7. The obserued lacts
We shall first examine in turn the facts relating to specialization and to
combination.
L.L. The phenomena  of specialization
The phenomena of specialization  may be detected ditectly in the production
statistics and indirecdy in the figures fot internal trade which are the
natural result.
On a very general approach  we see a shrinkage in every country in the
proportion of GNP coming from agriculture, which fell, for the Community
as a whole, by about half ovet the I5-year period. Fot industry,  however,
there has been some &vergence in the trend, with an incease in Italy,
the least industrialized  country, and in Germany, the most indusrialized.
In the other counuies the corresponding changes  have been quite small.
The proportion contributed by the services sector, increased in every
country, but more especially in France, Italy and the Nethedands.
From these pardally divergent  changes, it emerges that Germany has still
further increased her lead in Community  industry and ltaly has made up
some of her leeway, while both Ftance and Belgium have lost a little
ground by comparison with the other countties.
17A mc,re detailed analysis of eight industrial branches, for: which adequate
ancl comparable statistical data are available, does not show the efliects
of spe"cialization'with a.ny clatity. lln nearly every case the growth of the
Italian and Dutch induLstries was the most marked, but production in the
different  branches grerv in patallel in all the countries. Both the more
dyrarnic industries (such as the motor vehicle industry) and those'vith
slowe,t grorrth rates (textiles and food) are found in every case; and
everywhere the g;rowth in production of capital goods l,'as more marked
than that of consumer goods. It is difficult, therefore, tc) speak of special-
izatic,n at the level of the main industrial  branches. ffhe phenomenon
appe€rrs much more clearly, however, if ptoduction is compared at the
level of specific articles. The comparison discloses, for example,, Italian
specialization  in {oot'wear  and ceftain household electric goods, and German
specialization in r;ynthetic  fibres ancl yams. Unfortunatety the ptoduction
statistics are alto,gether inadequate  :[or this purpose and we must refet to
the statistics for external trade.
An eLnalysis rvas made of inffa-Cornrnunity trade in some twenty rnain
product groups. The results are the opposite of what might have been
expected, for the;r shou' a lower degree of concentration  oli trade by country
than in L958 an<Iin L955. fn othet words, two parallel phenomena  are
seen. In the firrit place, the predorninance  of specific  countries in paLrtic-
ulat branches is tendirrg to decrease.  This is the case, {cr example,  'with
Gernrany in metal'working  and in mechanical and elecuical engineering.
Thesr: branches  aLre, b)' tradition, representative of Gemran industry;  but
Germany's position in 1970, though still extremely strong, was less so
than in 1,958. ()n the other handl, the comparatively low export.inl; ca-
pacity oI these industries in the other countries has been showing a ten-
dency to improv,e. This can be seen, for example, in t;he case of metal
mantLfactures  exprorted frcm Francc, rvtrich demonstrates  the results o{i the
country's  industrialization effort.
This performancr:  by the expotters of the six countries in the Community
market may be compated with th,eir performance on the wider meLrket
of industrial counties other than Japan (extetnal trade of EEC ,countties
with EFTA countries, the USA and Canada).  Here, t,ro, the clegree of
specialization  has diminished, but the approximation  in the performa.nces
of tLLe Community countries is less marked than it has been irrside the
Community, though the disparities at the outset werc: quite definitely
more pronouncecl. In these extern.al markets, therefore,  the comparative
positions of the Six are more rigid than they are in the inra-Community
market, which thus ranks as an atf:a propitious to trans:[ormation.
18To sum up... during the 15 years covered by this investigation, the concen-
tration of exports by specific major product groups and by country has
shown a tendency to diminish, and this diminution is much more apparenr
on the intra-Community  market than in the markets of other industrial
countfies.
\ilhen, horvever, the analysis  is applied to much mor-e homogeneous  groups,
the results observed are entirely different, and advanced  degrees of speciali-
zation arc seen to have been maintained or to have made their appearance.
Using a nomenclature  which distinguishes some hundreds of producrs, we
see a very marked predominance  of one (or sometimes two) countries in
intra-Community  trade.
In the light of these first observations, a specific hypothesis can be put
forward. The decrease ir-r the gaps between  one country and another,
observed in relation io the 19 industrial branches in the Community
market, may be due to the fact that in 1970 (as opposed to 1955) none
of the countries is really unrepresented  ln any br:anch-or, inversely, no
country rcally stands by itself in any of them. At the root of this phe-
nomenon lie the indusrialization compaigns in France and Italy, and
the growing  approximation of the macro-economic structures of the
EEC countries. On the other hand, the considerable  disparities  noted in
specific products in any particular branch suggest that the counries which
wete lagging behind in the first instance have succeeded in finding a num-
ber of gaps which v'ere either still unfilled, or which were easily ap-
proachable  through the lack of competitive  resistance.  The repetition of
this phenomenon  in each industi'ial branch might thus explain that there
is a reduction in the general disparities  for the branch as a whole. It would
also explain the fact that the reduction is less marked in the uade with
outside countries.
To say that the positions  of the different  countries are growing incteas-
ingly similar does not mean that the structures are identical. Despite the
changes described, there are still material differences between the coun-
tries  :
(a) the German  economy retains its leading position in the mechanical
and electdcal industries;
(b) France is still somewhat  specialized  (as with the Netherlands)  in the
rade in agricultural and food products, but it has also secured an
important position in transport equipment  and tyres;
(c) Italy, with certain exceptions, shows no very marked predominance
fot major product groups;
I9(d) lBelgium retains its concentration on exports of metals (fet::ous  and
:non-ferrous)  and textiles, and shows scarcely any irrrprovement in its
comparative position as regardr; more up-to-date pro'ducts;
(e) r:he Netherlands  plays a predominant part in agriculture, the i[ood
industties and partly-processed products, such as fats and certain basic
,chemicals.
From the standpc'int of the rate at n'hich the different markets  are grouring,
the position can be summarized  by saying that German;l has successfully
maintained  its orientation towards products  for which the.markets  are grow'-
ing fastest and Belgium  has bately succeeded  in breaking a'ray from tlailitio-
nal proCucts  for r,,rhich rhe mar]<et gr,O$/th is slower. Among the th:ree coun-
tries which have been industr:ializing, the results in external tade show
materrial differences. France, by cornparison vdth its partners, is still
highly concentrated on products  which, apart from trarlsport equipment
and rubber, have only a limited future. The Netherlandr;  is comFaratiively
highly specialized in processed  ag;ricultural  produce and semi-products,
and the position 'of. Italy,like its ecc,nomic system, shows more of a duality,
since there is stiLil a concentration on raditional produr:ts (clotlhing and
footrvear) but also a concentration on the products of the mechanical  and
elec*ical industry, for which the demand is growing rapidly.
The impressions  recotr:led above must, however, be qualified by reca.lling
that a number of firu:s, notably the biggest, prefer to produce through
subsidiaries in foreign counnies rather than inctease their export t:rade.
This accounts, inL patticular, for the sffucture of expotts from the Nether-
lands.
L.2.'Ilhe phenomena of combination
The first report on competition policy states: 'There is in Europe no
systematic and c,chetent information on the changes which have been. due
to tlre creation of neur firms, to changes in the size of existing firms, to
combinations and to tlhe disappeara.nce of firms. For the time being it is
not possible to use official European statistics, ot even national statistics
compiled by the member countrielr, in order to carry out an analysis  at
Euro,pean level on the state and the development,  the causes and tlhe e{fects
of combinations.  It ryas for this reason that in 1970-7'L the Commission
laid dovrn an extensi\/e  programml-- of studies, the first stages of vrhich
are the starting point required for reaching  economically  valid cc'nclusions
about combinati,on in the Common, Market'.
This shortage oli infor'mation  prevents out giving a precise picture of the
development  of combination  since the Common Market was fbrmed.
20Howevef, various impressions  emerge from the fragmentary  data avaiable.
There was no spate of mergers in the period immediately  before or im-
mediately after the formation of the Common Market. The increase in
fhe number which occured in France ln 1959 did no more tlan re-establish
the level virtually reached in 1956-57 after the abnormal decline n 1,958.
It is only very lately that the number of mergers has shown a sharp
i11s1g2ss-21 any rate in Germany  and the Nethedands  and, to a lesser
degree, in France.
A digest of in{ormation about mergers, covering the period from 1961 till
mid-1969 has been made by Opera Mundi fot the Indusuial Policy Memo-
randum. ft covers fifteen branches o[. manufacturing industry, and relates
both to mergers and the taking up of control shareholdings. The results
show:
(a) that mergers within a single individual country represent, on the
average,  some 607o of the case noted;
( b ) that the second most important group consists of combinations  in
which companies from outside countries are involved. Operations of
this type have remained around the same high numetical  level as at
the beginning of the period, and ate thus becoming  ptogressively less
important by comparison  with the other gtoups.
It is noted, too, that between 1966 and 1970 there was a definite inctease
in the number of operations of international inter-penetration and in the
tendency  towards combination in the EEC. There are various indications
that the action taken in this connection by firms in the member countries
shows an increase by comparison with firms in outside countries.
2. Genesis ol the changes  noted.
Four groups of. otganizations  have taken part in the reorganization of pro
duction structures throughout Community territory. These are:
(a) Community firms,
(b) foreign firms,
(c) national Governments,
(d ) Community  InstituLions.
The changes we have observed over nearly 15 years result from the
combined  sffategies of these four groups. In some cases the strategies
have operated independently, in some cases they have been coordinated,
and in some they have been opposed to one another.
2lThe three types of inritrument  avajilable to the Commiss'ion arc r{,rticle 86
of tlhe EEC Treaty (eLbuse of dominant positions), the r:onrol of national
aids and subsidies (Article 92), and directive documentrs. To these could
also be added Community  financia[ intervention. These instruments  have
beerr brought into use only very recently, or only very sparingly.
For example, ithe provisions about dominant tr)ositions  contajned  in
Article 86 did not lead ta any action by the Commission until 1971.
This Article, tLetefole, coull only influence combination activities over
the L5-year period thr:ough the idr:a formed by business; fitms of the rvay
in which it migiht be interpreted  try the Commission.
As regards aids, it \\,'as necessary to begin, in cooperation  with the me,mbet
Go'l'ernments,  the lon,g task of cornpiling  a list of national aids, analysing
the reasons for tlem and arriving at a general  assessment of the position
in tlee industier; or tr:gions concetned. It was therefole only li'ithin the
last three or four years that any de,cisions wete reached. These concerned:
in July Il)69: aids to shipbuilding;
in June 
'J.9t7L; arids for regional-development purpresss'
in July 1971: limits on aid in the textile industrlr;
in July 1972: the aircraft-manufacturing  industry.
In addition, the Commission  has intervened in more specific  cases in three
or fout industries.
So liar as concerns  texts laying down guidelines fot indusuial structures,
certain very general ones have indeed been adopted  ( ser:ond meclium-term
econromic  policy programme ( 1968); memorandum on industrial policy
(March t970)); but, apan from the ECSC General Objectives-which
for ten years past have related only to steel-and the Euratom  llllustr:ative
Programmes,  it was :not until t9'71 that the first industrial-sector  docu-
ments made theiir apprearance. It is therefore true to sa'r that, until .1969,
intervention  by Community Institutions specifically  aimed at reorganiz;ation
of p,rsdu6d.n srtructu:res was only on a very modest scale, except i:n the
case of iron and steel and the collir:ries, and that it is orrly during the past
two yeafs that a.ny appreciable intervention has begun to take place.
Goaernments. Entry into the Cornmon Market in 1958 was very much
a leap in the dark, and several of the Governments of member countries
soup;ht to put the firms in their own counries in as g;ood a position as
possible to withstand the foreign competition.  They clid this by having
tecourse to methods which were not forbidden by the Treaty of ni.ome,
(such as fiscal arrtitudes to promote self-financing; the extension  od regional
22aids; infrastructure development; education and ttaining; and, in some
countries, influence on undertakings in the public sector).
Among Commttnity firrus, four main lines of behaviour may be noted:
(a) no change in previous lines of behaviour. This does not signify
;6'sd;. oT development or innovarion among these firms, but rathei
that the opening of the frontiers did not have any noteworthy effect
on their current management or their investment decisions. This
position was to be seen among a considerable number of firms catefing
{or local markets which, before 1958, were scarcely  affected by com-
petition over the whole of their national territory (especially in the
bigger countries)  and which were rherefore  moved by no alarm about
foreign competition and had no particular desire to conquer foreign
markets. The building industry is a good example of this type of
behaviour;
(U) d"&$ly9-fgAgqq.  The essential objective in such cases is to lieep
;pFroxffiat.iy  lh-a same share of the marker (usually the national
market ) as be{ore. Tvro tactical approaches  were noted. On the one
hand the firm might seek to cope with foreign competition by teducing
its production costs, either by investment for modernization  or by
some degree of specialization.  The other defensive approach consisted
in operating  through cartels and similar agreements. It is difficult
to say how grea;t a use q/as made of this, but there can be no doubt
that it was indeed used;
(c) offensive action inside the Community. In these cases the firm
fontiers to conquer the new
external markets. This behaviour is of special interest in those indus-
tties in which economies of scale could play an important part. In
such cases the conquest of external markets not only makes it possible
to enlarge the firmls commercial  outlets but also tends to reduce unit
costs and so enable it to preseme or extend its share of the internal
market;
(d) offensive action at wo*llevel. In this case the firm sought ro take
advantage  of tle economies of scale in a wider market and find itself
a place in the world market. It tended to regard the Community
market as unduly narrow, and its sffategy developed  at once, either
at European level, at least, of at wodd level. A strategy on these
lines may be operated  by the firm on its own initiative, or with the
help of its government.  The former was the case with various multi-
national firms which, even before 1958, were accustomed to thinking
23intemationally  and were just as intetested in development in non-
member  countries as in Com:munity tenitory, whi,:h they deerned to
be unduly small. This goes some way towards explainiqg the fact
that it was only to a moderate extent that such fimrs sought estarblish-
ment in tlhe meLrkets of the other member countties, whether  by
merger or by buying up smaller undertakings.
The secorrl case applies to l.trms of some size but which wc,rk in
fields in which the risk is gteat or in which aid fr:om public sources
is considered a necessity before new operations can be undertaken.
The clearest instance is that of the aircraft indusry, in which a
number of big European finns agreed among the'mselves to launch
cooperative  projects, such as rConcorde and the Airbus, with financial
assistance on a massive scale from the public authorities.
Foreign firrns. Foreign firms in this context means American  firms and
European firms from countries orrtside the Common iMarket  (especially
British and Swedish fi.rms and, more recently, also Japanese firms). 'They,
too, might react defensively or ofliensively. Their defensive  attitude was
aimed at neutra.lizing  possible adverse effects on their business frorn the
elinrination of barrierr; in the Comrnunity. Their offensive attitur:le,  o,n the
other handn was aimecl at deliberately profiting from the big unifi,ed nrarket
which was being set rrp.
The:re were three basiic approaches, all of which were applied both offen-
sively and defensively':
(i)  expansion of existing subsidiaries. Outstanding examples of this
were in the motor-manufactr.rring industry and the datal:rocessing
indusffies;
(ii) formation of ners subsidiarier; where none previouLsly  existed. This
case was the most frequent;
(iii) the takeover of existing firms in order to make use of existing; pro-
duction facilities (e.g. the CJrrysler  takeover of Simca) or' of high-
quality research groups  ( take,rvet of Bull by General Electr:ic ), or-
and this occurrecl most often--in order to secure quick cornmand  of
a marlceting organaation which was thoroughly lamiliat with the
peculiaritier;  of each of the Etrropean  national  markets.
3. trtesalts ol tbis acti'on
Taken together, the v'atious forms of smategy and intelvention described
abol'e resulted in changes which varied greatly between one industq' and
24another but which, if  various minor differences are ignoted, can be
classified in a few main categories: 
1
3.1. Industries producing  semi-finished  goods and. cofisaner goods in
which economies of scale play an important part. Notable examples in
this category are various mechanical and elecrical industries, chemicals
and steel. For all these products tlre growth in inua-Community trade
has been very considerable. Producers have clearly been seeking to secure
an important  place in the markets of the Community countries. This
phenomenon, incidentally,  came to the surface quite quickly after the
signature of the Treaty of Paris for the steel industry and the Treaty of
Rome fot the other indusmies.  This means that the leaders of the
industries concerned  did not wait till all customs barriers had been removed
but went ahead of this and lost no time in setting up their marketing
facilities. There are a number of indications  that the same thing is going
to happen befween  the Six and the three new members.
In some cases this expansion in trading was accompanied  by genuine specia-
lizatlon. In some cases, on the other hand, consumers benefited by being
offered an extended range of products.  One instance is the case of
household electrical goods. These are consumer  durables for which the
number of buyers is great, and these buyers are not motivated by national
preference.  The customs  duties were formerly often very high and their
elimination,  and that of the quota restrictions which existed in some cases,
were factors making for important  changes, both in the production
structures and in the location of producers.  These changes were probably
helped still further by the existence of a market which was growing  very
vigorously  and in which economies of scale could be utilized more easily.
The extreme  case in that of refrigerators, in which a few Italian producers,
starting from small beginnings,  were able within a few years to build up a
crushingly  dominant position, providing  70Vo of. Community production
in 1970 against only 20Vo in 1958. At the same time they supply practically
the whole of the Italian market.
In the motor industry  developments  have been quite different.  The num-
ber of buyers is again very big; but tlere is still a strong tendency tovrards
a nationally oriented consumer preference, and a tendency towards
1 Acricr:lture  is not o<amined hete, eince it has already  been the subject of many
studies (especially the annexes to the Mansholt Plan and the annual  report on the
state of agiiculture in the EEC). Moreover, an analysis of the changes-which  have
taken place in the past five years is in pteparation.
25regional preference has even bee.n noted. Moreover the grovrth-riate in
the market was less vigorous. The structural changes  which have taken
place consisted mainiy of longer production  runs, ancl there was little
sper:ialization  (:in some cases, inde,ed, the rend was in the opposite direc-
tiol:L); furtherffrofe, t.here were v,3ry few changes in the formzLl or iegal
organization in the industry. After 1958, the producers in Community
countries  secur€rd verlr fig increasers in their share of one ailother's ma.rkets.
Taking the Courmunity as a rvhoie, the proportion of cars sold in a country
oth,er than that where they were manufactured  rose fuom7Vo in 1958 to
31% io 7970. In the same period the share of cars from nc'n-member
countries in the total new registrations increased  only ftom 0.BVo to ',2.l,Vo.
Flo.vever, these tendencies t'ele ,n operation in practically all the Com-
munity countrics, so that there v'as no revolutionary change in the com-
parative share ol each producer in the total deliveries in Communiq/ territory.
The,re were, of course,  changes  on a moderate scale, vrith an increase in
the share of firrns such as Renault. Fiat. Peuseot  a.nd Nlercedes  ancl a com-
parative dectease for Volksw-agen.
In  the iron and steel industry, intra-Community  trade increased very
sharply. In 19.54 it lepresented ll7o of Communiry production:; thr: pro-
portion has bee,n increasing  consistently  and is now atround 207o. The
ttend towards combination  in this indusmy has been in.tensive durinig the
past decade; and thisr can be seen in the fact that 707o of Community
production novr comes from eigftrt groups of firrns, compared with 1j
groups in 1.958. It is to be noted, nevertheless,  that the mer.gers  have
taken place entirely tretween  companies in the same country, sa,ire only in
the one case of Hoesch-Hoogovens.  There is, incident,ally, no leasc,n for
.thinking  that reorganizaticln c,f rhe iron and steel industrfy,  involving many
more cross-frontier  mergers,  would have resulted in a more efficierrt reorgan-
ization of the produ,ction machine.  The pooling of the iron and steel
indurstries of the Six counries  was, in 1951., essentially a political act, at
a tirne when str:el production was considered  both as a motive force for
the whole economy and as one of the sinews of u'ar. Under both these
heacls, the cornp)afative  importance of the industry has gready djminj.shed.
As ,a first appr,cximation it is estimated that the induLsties which have
passed through the type of development  illustrated in th,tse three examples
account for nea.rly half the Comm,unity's industrial actiivity.
3.2. Qaite a namzber of industries;  haue been much le.rs allected b'y tbe
com,mon market. These comprise in the first instance certain indusffies
in u.hich the individual firms cope with markets which are compararrively
localized or which cannot easily enter into external trade. The clearest
26instance is the construction  indusry, in which the technological develop-
ment of the past 15 years has certainly been far from negligible but has
not been materially influenced  by the opening of the frontiers. Admittedly,
the vigorous expansion in the building uade owes much to the increase
o{ putchasing power and thus indirectly to the existence of the Common
Market; but even in the pooling of experiences  and research to resolve
problems which arise in similar terms in every country, the progress made
has been extremely modest, and neither the national nor the Community
authorities have yet made any tangible effort to improve matters.
The construction  indusuy, and the othei industrial branches which come
in the same category, represent about a third of industry in tJre Community.
Other indusuies which come under the present heading include those
which have sought, by some degree of concerted practice, to keep their
share of the market in approximately the same balance as before, and thus
to bypass the effects of increased competition. One of the most recent
examples o{ this was provided by the chid Community sugar producers,
who sought to guarantee  the strength of one another's position in their
respective national markets and preserve  {ot themselves  in those markets the
control of the marketing of sugar for human consumption.  ft seems indeed
that the propottion of Community industry which has behaved in this
way is quite small; but the real significance of these cases is all the
greater  because such pockets of illegality are capable of being examples of
the most vexatious kind.
3.3. Tbe energy sector is a case apart because both the Governments and
the Community fnstitutions have always declared it to be a mattet o{.
special interest, and the idea of a common energy policy, though it does
not figure in the Rome Treaties, was officially recognized  as long ago as
1967 in a special intet-Governmental protocol. Nevertheless, despite decla-
rations which have been several times fenewed, it has not yet proved
possible to make any substantial progress  towards the implementation  of
a teal common energy policy. The fundamental reason lies in the lack of
agreement between the member countries as to the order of priority
between  the objectives of such a policy, especially as between  cheap energy
supplies,  the srengthening of the security aspect and the progtessive
character of ransformation. For a long time it seemed that these diver-
gencies were due to the great diversity of energy-supply  structures in the
different countries; but even now, with imported crude oil accounting  for
the greater pan of the supply in all Community  countries, it has not yet
been possible to teconcile the different standpoints  effectively because most
countries regard oil policy as an important  aspect of their foreign policy.
273.4. Group ol industries wbich l,enefits  by a particuld'r interest frc,rn the
Gouernment.  National governments take a special interrest in these indus-
ries, either because they are buyers of a large pat of the p,rsduq6, .t
because the industties are considered strategically irnportant from the
standpoint of Long-term economic:  development. For the most part they
are indusffies  in whilch the initial research and develc'pment  expenditure
murst be particulady  €ireat, and in which extensive financial backing  is there-
fore a particulatly inrportant asset. They are also industries in whi,ch big
multinational firms play an especially important part.
The mere opening of the internal frontiers of the C,ommon Malket is not
enough to produce a'ppreciable  changes for these industries. Ctn ttLe one
hand, the customs barriers can be in large measure byp,assed  by setting up
subsidiaries  in those countries where the firms concer:ned  are seehing to
secure a matket; ancl on the other, they are industries  for which public
ordefs are an appreciable part of the market and in vzhich national prefer-
ences fotm an obstacle to its conquest, which is far mc,re formiiable than
customs duties.
It is thus easy to understand  why the simple eliminatic'n of tracle barriers
has not given rise to great sructtrral changes. What has been lacking is
agreement  at Ciommunity level, firstly on the thorouE;h  liberullization  of
puL'lic-contract  awardls,  secondly on a joint R & D ancl innovarion effort
in specific  branches of industry, and thirdly on a comrnon attitude about
tlre structural  rcotga:nizations  which ate desirable an<l the part foreign
comrpanies should be encouraged to play. As a result, the only important
actirln taken ha.s consisted in inter-Governmental  aglerments on aircraft
marrufa.cture-but even then with,cut cross-frontier mergers-or has been
the work of m,ultinational  firms in the data-processin.g sector' In the
latter case tentative  approaches  aimed at mergers to pro<luce  genuine Euro-
pean undertakings have aroused little enthusiasm either in the, firms or
in rnost of the governments.
-Adrnittedly,  the industries in question represent only a rnodest  10!% or so
of aLll indusmial activ:ity;  a few years ago the part they could play in the
economy w4s SrolD€w.hat ovetestimated,  and we ar€ now revefting to a
mor,e balanced idea oli the mechanisms of industrial growth. They could,
neveftheless,  be very valuable as pacemakers fot the rvhole economy by
promoting rapidl innovation, and it is this which makes them impo.rtant.
Moreovet, most of tfrem are of the type in which substantial tronomies
of sr:ale can be a,chieved  thtough specialization in individual  firms aLnd lrnger
production runs" They are thus sectors in which the Cornmon Market ,could
have been especially trcneficial.
28\fhat was it in the last analysis that we expected from the Common
Market? We hoped to see an inctease in trade, specialized production
and the oppottunity for developing production  on a scale which was only
feasible against the background of a big home market. And what have
we so far secured?
So far as trade is concerned  the increase has been spectaculat, for intra-
Community trade has grown twice as fast as that with the rest of the
world, though rvithout any slackening of the inctease in the latter by
compatison  rvith the years which preceded the formation of the Common
Market.
On the question of specialization,  the answer must be more qualified. Part
of the increase in trade is indisputably  due to the expansion of certain vety
specialized producers in some of the countries and the advance of some of
them to leading positions as suppliers to the whole Community. This, for
example, has been the case with the ltalian tefrigerators. In other cases,
however, the increase in uade has not been linked to any appreciable
extent with specialized production. Producers from several countries ate
bringing much the same types o{ goods to market but the increase  in trade
has brought benefit to consumers in so far as they have a wider range of
products from which to choose.
On the third point the rcply is still rather negative. The fields concetned
are aircraft manufacture,  data-processing,  the building of nuclear power
stations, space wotk, rnajor apparatus for basic research, and mass produc-
tion of various types of equipment for public setvices such as urban
transport. Of all these fields, aircraft production is the only one in which
there has been any real effort, which has borne fruit in the Concorde and
Airbus programmes and an important re-grouping of the firms concerned.
The Commission  takes the vievr that the effort is still insufficient  ( see the
memorandum on airctaft manufacturing  policy ) ; but nevertheless it has
been made, and it has gone beyond the limits of the Community of the
Six. In all the other fields, no appreciable progress has yet been achieved.
As things have turned out, the best results have been obtained in the
ttaditional industries, for which the opening of the frontiers  was a powerful
stimulus to trade and to a certain degree of structural  reorganization.
In the newer industries, however,  matetially dependent as they are on
public orders or on public aid for mitigating  some of the special  risks,
progress recorded  has been extremely small, for lack of any rcal common
policy covering  the fields concerned. It was not, in fact, till 1'971 or 1972
that the first sectoral proposals made their appeatance. The national
attitudes vary from country to country, but they are all united in evading
29the main issues. sorne countries put the accent on competition  poli,:y and
the market economy as the instrument by which gro'wth can be :fastest
and. best directed. others deem it necessary to strengthen their: big firms
at national  level before setting ou! on industrial reorganization at Commu-
nitl' lsr.1. others reject the idlea of public inrervention in ind,ustrial
questions and v'ould leave the big firms to be masters of their ourn destiny.
And others, again, arc most concerned with regional imLbalances  and think
mole of expan,cing the traditional indusries than of encouraging those
whjich have their eyes turned to ttre future. These different attirrudes  have
all played their part in delaying the possibility of conr:rere discussion on
policies for indjividua[ indusries apart from those which are having adap-
tation difficulties.
The relative importanLce assigned to the various problerrrs has shr:um many
changes  over the past 15 or 20 years. The viewpoint of the Treaty of
Rome was inspired b,y' tJre dominant  worry which prevailed at the time of
its drafting. This was the compartmentarization  of the .European  economy
-a 
division irrto pa.rtitions  which was very advancecl for the trade in
goods and total for the movements  of capital. The most urgent task was
therefore seen to be the opening of the frontiers; but or." tlr.r., frontiers
w€rr3 oP€Il, both betrveen membel  countries and with non-memLber coun-
ffies, the problem thrnt then became dominant was to secure a place for
the European economy in a wodd of rapid technological  cha'ge 'vhich was sttongly inlrluenced by the mig;hty multinational firms and by' the large
countries. It  has be,en the worll of the past few years to secure full
recognition of these problems. The first concrete  proposals arc the work
of the past few montles, and results cannot be expected until several years
have passed.
30CHAPTER 4
The Community and the EutoPean
For the citizen of Europe the expected effect of the Common Market was
to be 'an accelerated  raising of the standard of living' and 'improved
working conditions and an improved  standard of living for workers,  so as
to make possible their harmonization  while the improvement is being
maintained'.
At the same time, however, many fears were expressed:
(a) rvas there not a danger that the Common  Market might be an obstacle
to bold social policies in countries desiring to undertake them, espe-
cially when it came to equalization  of incomes and increasing the
importance of the machinery for redisribution of incomes?
(b ) would not the use of the national product be increasingly  channelled
into productive investment, at the expense of public investment?
In other words, would not the keener competition  between the
different countries of the Community lead to excessive impottance
being assigned to the growth rate, to the detdment of improvement
in the forms of economic  growth?
(c) was there not a risk that the changes in ptoduction sttuctures arising
through the opening of the frontiers would have a bad effect on
employment, both in general and for individual firms and regions?
A full statement  of present  and future problems, and a definition of social
objectives, were recently put forward in the 'Preliminary guidelines for a
Community social-policy programme'. Thtee themes have been selected
for discussion below. These are:
(i)  raising of the standard of living and improvement in living conditions;
(ii) redistribution and levels of incomes;
( iii) employment problems.
311. )Taising  the standard of liuing
A first indicati'n of the improvement  in the standard of living is to be
fou:nd in the inmease in the 'real' national  product  per head. In-the com-
murrity as a wh,ole, it rose by about 70%o between 195g and 191,0, so that
tlre,average annual increase  s,as 4.5Vo, If the figures ar:e converted at the
exchange rates then prevailing, the average income in the Community in
197-0 
-rvas materially higher than that in the unitc-d Kingdom and abour
half that in the united States; and the difference in the" latter cas,e had
grown materially  smalller over the l5-year period. on the other hanrJ, the
gap between  the cornmunity andl Japan is also growing smailer.  The
Japanese  level is nou' nearing thlee quarters of the u.,r"og. crcmrnLunity
income, and is thus nLearly the sarne as the level in Italy, whereas it was
only'half as much 15 ,lears ago.1
As between the member countries, the disparities sh'w a co.nslderable
difference accorr:ling  t,o whether w: think in ierms of GNp per iinhabitant
(i.e. national supply availabilities p,er inhabitant)  or of the GNp per mem_
ber of -the _acti'e population  (i.e. national production per worlfer), In
particular,  the gap betu/een the Nethedands and the other countr.ies  €irows
deeprer when ttre comparison is on a per inhabitant  basis, because the
proprortion of the worliing populati,rn is smaller than in t,he other counrries.
owitrg to the comparatively  lou' fernale emplol,rnsnl 121s,.
rt is, of_ course, impossible to state categorically that this improtement in
stan,iards of living is the direct and exclusive consequence of ihe formation
of the common Market. There is" nevertheless,  a strong presurnption to
this effect, because of rvhat has been said above 
"boui 
ihe in,ciea,se in
production. Furthen:oore, the increase in trade has put a much larger
range of goods at the disposal olF the consumer. (It is stilt an open
question whether the buyer is as yet sufficiently infornred of tt,e compa-
radve quality of the various prodlucts and therefore alble to dr:rive full
benefit from the wider choice. This is a matter which dre comrnission  is
currently considr:ring  ).
on the question of improvement  in the quality of life,, the Treaty  says
1 The inc.ome  comparisons  between the different munffies  were made on the basis of
the. prevailing rate of exchange, _which iil not a very satisfactory instrument for com- paring the purchasing  pcwer of -currency units. A -ot" "uii,L 
lo,np^il,;orr  rvould
requlce a calculatic'n  based on 'shoppinl3 baskets' comparable betweerr thr: different countries. A calculation  ,on these lines'was  made on 6ne occasi,rn bv rhe Srat,stical
,o-ffi:,: of ,the Eurc'pean.communities  for ECSC *o.t..r-in-rijl.  i_lnioitunut,.ty i,
Yt "]=Y,o 
been possible,fo:r  this to be repeated, largely because  of the non-cornpatability
or retru.t prlces rn the dlflerent countries.
3Zvery little. This was perhaps  because the priority problem in 1.957 was
'an accelerated raising of the standards of living'; attention was concen-
trated on producing more, before considering  how to share it.  fn connec-
tion udth these problems, and the priorities between them, ideas have
changed a good deal over the past 15 yeats, as also have the concepts
applied in assessing  changes in living conditions. Before, we talked almost
exclusively  about 'standards of living', but now it is the kind of life, or the
quality of life, which is discussed. The former measure used, or pethaps
abused,  was quantitative; now, qualitative  considerations  are becoming  the
order of the day but they still require statement  and definition if they are
to be used as guides to action.
No Community  steps have been taken for the specific purpose of rechan-
nelling in any special direction  the tesoutces  which are available in increased
quantities owing to the growth in production. The Trcaty, in Eact,
demonstrated  great confidence in the working of the Common Market itself
as a means of promoting an improved  standard of living and its harmoni
zation while the improvement was being maintained.
Actual|y, averuge consumption expenditure per head almost doubld
between 1958 and 1970; and the growth was a little more marked in the
two countries where the initial level was lowest and a litde less marked
in the trlro countties where it was highest. There has thus been an
appreciable movement tovrards  approximation in the different countries.
This big increase in resources has brought about a substantial cJrange in
their distribution over the different expenditure headings. The proportion
of spending going on food has fallen by between 5Vo and 10Vo, accotding
to the counffy concerned,  and the protr)ortions  spent on health, uansport
and to some extent rents have shown a matefial increase. There has been
a certain tendenry for the budget proportions in the diffetent countries
to come closer together, except in the case of Italy, which is following the
same ffend as the othef countries but with a time lag of 8 to L0 years.
This general trend towards approximation is, however, subject to a number
of exceptions.  The outstanding  ones are the particulady low figure for
transport and telecommunications  in the Netherlands, the particularly high
one for health in France, and the figure for housing investment in ltaly,
which is still much lower than that reached in the other countries as long
ago as L958.
Though private consumption expenditure in real terms gives us a first idea
of changes in standards of living, it is increasingly recognized to be an
inadequate  indicator, because  the increase in incomes  leads individuals to
53dev,cte an increasing proportion to payment for services 'which are gerLerally
not obtained irr the market but s;upplied by public auLthorities, In some
fiells, such as health and edur:ation,  pubiic autholities play a pre-
dominant part (more than two-th,irds of the total expenditure  ) ; in other
fieftls, such as housing, recteation, tansport and telecommunications, the
projportion is allso large (between !57o and 30%o). We are tlhus.led to
bdrrg in the notion of enlarged  cawsamption,  which includes both private
conrsumption  expenditure and public expenditure. It is notecl that the
conrsumption headings showing  ttre most rapid growth are in fact those
in lyhich the conttibu:tion o{ public authorities is the m,rst marked.
On several  occasions  in the last few years, too, public authorities have put
for''vard the idea that the proportions of the GNP spent ,)n public consump-
tionL and public amenities should increase faster than private consumption.
This attitude is to be found both.in national documents  and in r;uch Com-
munity documents as the first medium-term economic policy progrrrmme.
The lattet document, however,  tzrkes no more than a general view; but
sornLe of the nrrtional documents, such as the French Plan, Lave given
details and figurcs regarding the sectors to be given pr:iority.
Ancl what has, in fact, been the real rend?
Bet.ween 1960 and 1970 the propirrtion of public consumption leas s'hown
an appreciable increas;e in Germany, Belgium and the lrtretherlands,  lrhich,
hovrevef,  contrasts lrith a decline in France. There has also ber:n an
increase in the public proportion in total investment. f'his was very vigo
rour; in France and Belgium  an<l vigorous, also, in Germany, an'd the
Netherlands.  i
The changes in the decade in question were therefore in the din:ction
regerrded as des,irable, but closer examination  reveals that this happened
more particularly in the earlier part of the period. Iletween L96:i and
L970, on the otler hand, with a Community GNP rir;ing at tlhe rate of
5.2lVo pet annuln, public consumption  increased  by 3.2%, and public invest-
ment by 4.97o compared  vrith exp,:ctations  of.47o andti.57o.
Vir:h the single excep'tion of Belgium, it is as though, at the very moment
when it was officiall'y stated that the prcportion of the GNP going into
public investment shc'uld inctease, it abruptly ceased to increase,
An explanationL must therefore be sought for the .bct that. what is
apparently considered to be a priority requirement, at any rate by a large
part of the populatio:n,  has not secured a more substantial increase jin the
public expenditure applied to satisfying that requirement. \(e naust think
J+in this connection  of the lamentations  in several Community counffies over
the deterioration  in urban living conditions, the state of the roads and the
level of university equipment. \7e must also seek an explanation of the
fact that the share of the national product going into public investment is
appreciably higher in the Netherlands  and Germany ( and also in the United
Kingdom)  than it is in France, Belgium and Italy. To be more precise...
is this phenomenon connected with the formation of the Common Market?
An explanation  which seems attractive at first sight lies in the simultaneous
character of the public infrastructure  investment to m€et the needs of
consumers and the productive investment to raise the production  capacity
and efficiency of private firms. It might well be that the keener competi-
tion attributable  to the Common  Market could have led to the accent being
put on investment in the latter class. In fact, however, public investment
increased proportionately  more than the investments  of private firms.
Following the same line of thought, it could also be suggested that Ger-
many, which was the more highly industrialized  country at the outset, was
able to devote more resources to public investment  thanltaly, which had
arrears to make up. This explanation, however, is not general; for in the
Netherlands industrialization was also lagging behind to a certain extent,
but that country has nevertheless  remained in the lead in its allocations
for public in{rasffucture investment.
A second explanation is sometimes sought in economic policy. In this
connection the increasingly open attitude towards the outside world and
delays in the fashioning and application of Community  instruments,  have
diminished the effectiveness of control through monetary instruments, and
this, it is suggested,  may have led public authorities to fall back on bud-
getary methods  of control, in which the expenditure limitations have fallen
essentially  on public investment. The explanation is logical, but its confir-
mation by the figures is only paftial. The increase in investment by public
administrations has indeed been halted, and there have even been cutbacks
in Germany and Italy, but it has proceeded very regularly in France  and
fairly regularly in the Benelux countries. In the United Kingdom, too,
there has been concutrently  a very marked stop-go policy and a high level
of public investment.
The greatest significance seemes to attach to explanations  based on national,
fiscal and budgetary practice. The counries in which the rate of public
investment  is comparatively low are also those in which direct taxation
is least heavy, fiscal discipline least strict, the autonomy  of local authorities
least marked; and the scale of the public investment necessary  is latgely
determined by accelerated urban development.
35Mofeovet, the j.nuease in the requirements for public in{rastn:Lcture  has
not been follow'ed at the same rate by tire development of ideas on the
divir;ion of tasks between the public and the pdvate sectors. Where the
size of the fiscal buldens in Cornmunity countries ha,s reached a level
which it would be di{i[icult to exceed, both for sociological and for political
feasrsls-41 any tate at the present time-there  has ber:n some degr'ee of
inertia in breaking  arvay from earlier habits, and the result has been an
insuf{iciency o{ budget provisions for dealing with trew tasks. Admittedly
there has, for some years, been some proli{erati,rn  of ideas about the
financing of pulblic services, with discussion  of public finance and tolls,
private financing, etc,; and there has been an intensir;'e  develo,pment  of
sruiiy based on 'rationalization  of budget choices' which provides a clearer
idea of the comparison between thLe cost of these public services and theit
real utility to the public and the various elements which constit.ute the
pubJlic.
It ir; only quite lately that these studies and discussions began, and r;o fat
the results have been comparativel.y modest. It is reas,cnable tc, sup,pose,
how'ever, that they will have a powerful influence in fixing the priorities
for the use of the national product and the best methods of ptocedure,
and they .vill ttrus help in giving cletailed application to the general desire
for an improvernent in living coniiitions through the de,velopment o{i con-
sumption and infrasffucture  investrnent.  The Commission  is endeavouring,
in c,cnnection with its ovrn responr;ibilities, to contribute to this compaign
for jintroducing  a more rational and coherent element into the economic and
budgetary  choic,:s.
The tvo first e>rplanations  suggested  above, and linked rvith the formLation
oL the Common Marllet, are thus seen to be not wholly wrong, but they
do rLot go fully trr the root of the ma.tter. If the process o[ growth  sterrLming
from the Common Nlarket and linked vrith the openirLg of the fro:rtiers
seems to have created a number of problems in the way the national prrcduct
should be used, this is largely because the necessary  chranges in the ,admi-
nistration  of public finance  and bu<lgetary  choice have be,en follo'liting some
way behind.
2. lncomes  and social securi!y
2.1. Distribution of the national incorne
An important question to be asked is vrho has in fact had the benefit of
this increase in productivity, production  and income.  Flas the remarkable
economic growth of the past 15 years been accompaniedi by a reduction in
the inequalities of income,  and has it been successfull inL mitigating, iI not
36in actually eiiminating, the pockets of poverty inside the Community  ?
Unfortunately it must be said at the outset that, in the present state of
available information, it is not possible to give a straight ansv/er to this
question. For vatious reasons the countries  of \0estern Europe-like most
other countries in the worl'd except, up to a certain point, the United
States-have  always refused to ascertain the exact situation of their popu'
lations as tegards incomes.  Statistics of income distribution are either
not collected  at all or not published in any tegular and systematic fashion;
ar-rd, oddly enough,  scarcely  any university research  has been made for the
purpose of obtaining  an objective view from the many elements of partial
information  which are nevettheless available. Everything suggests that
citizens and political bodies alike ptefer not to have that precise  knowledge
of the facts which might, indeed, call in question many of their pteconceived
ideas.
From this collection of national ignorances it is obviously difficult to give
a description of the situation in the Community,  and the best we can do,
there{ore, is to offer a few ftagmentary  indications,  In the three main
sectors-agriculture, indusffy and 5srvisss-there have been extreme differ-
ences in the increase in added value per head, which has been much higher
for agriculture  than for industry and still more so than for the services.
Admittedly, the remuneration of the active population  does not change in
exactly the same way as the added value; but the gaps between the sectors
are wide enough to make it possible to state with certainty that the
average income in agriculure has tended to apptoximate  more closely to
the average income in the economy as a whole. This is in confotmity
with tlie obiectives  of the Treaty (Article 39).
In all the countries the distribution between  rvage and salary incomes and
other incomes has shown a tendency for the ptoportion represented  by
wage and salaty remunerations to increase. At the same time, too, the
proportion of the active population working as v/age-eatners has also in-
creased,  largely because of the decrease in the numbers working in agri-
culture. C,onversely  there has been a mateial decline in the shate of the
national income of individual entrepreneurs,  and in the proportion of non-
wage-earnefs to the total active population. If these various trends are
compared over the period 7960-70,  we do not find any substantial defor-
mation of the share of the national income per head as between wage-eatners
and others.
2.2. Soclal security
The concept of harmonization of social systems, which figures in Article LL7
of the Rome Treaty, is not self-explanatory. It is important, in the first
JIplace, to agtee on the meaning of the word 'harmonization', whiclL is named
as o'ne of the e{fects expected from the operation of the Common Market.
In .1958, overall similarities  maniirested themselves betrveen  the crtunmies
side by side with dissimilarities of <letail. The total amount of redistibution
expenditure represented  sums v6r1,ing between  L0.67o  and l4.1Vo of the
GNP. In overall ternls, therefore, there wete no consiilerable gaps rvhich
might in themselves have hindeled the establishment of an economic
balance in the Ciornmrrnity.
ff, however, this total is broken down by social expenditure headings, thete
are seen to have been great differences  between the: countries itr the
functional distribution of social expenditure. In  Ic,l62, for example,
Germany was giving very much less in family benefits than rvas France, but
materially more in olcl-age, death and sutvivor benefits.'Ihe  same was true
of the Netherlands  and Luxembourg.
There were thurs important divergencies reflecting national prefelences  and
con(reptions releLting to the priority of the risks or situations requiring to
be covered by an instrrance system organized on the nat.ional scale.
Over the I5-year per:iod the position has changed considerably, and the
disp,arities are now decidedly  smallet.
In all the counmies social expenditure has increased mtrch faster than the
GNP. There ar.:, of course, still gaps between the highest and the lowest
prolDortion  of tlhe GIJP which goes on social expenditure, but the gap of
aronnd 3.5Vo i:; applicable to rising proportions of the total, the average
o[ u,hich was l',lVo in 1958. I5Vo in 1962 and l9%: in'-1970.
At the same time the propottion of the population covered agains;t sickness
ancl invalidity risks has shown a considerable  inctease.
In addition, the disribution of thir; expenditute between  the main hea.dings
has also shovrn substantial changes,  resulting in a spectacular decrease  in
the differences bet'uveen the countries. Fot health insurance, the gap between
the highest and lowest proportion of the total was 73-26 and is nou' 22-31;
for old-age benefits,  the corresponding figutes are 32-417 and 37-45; and
even for family allowances, largely' owing to the considr:rable reduction in
tlre proportion  in France andltaly, the change is from 7-30 to 8-2:.1.
Over the whole field it is indisputable  that there has been a certain har-
monization. This doer; not result clirectly from Community  action, for the
deci.sions are stj:ll in national hands and no Commtrnity  directive, has been
issued. Betrveen  the Community partners, however, a pemanLent  docu-
3Bmentation system  has been olganized,  and there have been many exchanges
of ideas.
Both the national administrations and the two sides of industry have thus
been better informed of the methods applied in neighbouring countries and
the reasons for them; and in that way a certain spirit of emulation  has
been created  which has helped to bring the different national situations
closer iogether.  There can thus be no denying that the Community has been
a contributory influence.
llorvever the question of rvhether such a trend towards equality is indeed
a factor of progress can only be answered from a political standpoint. An
increase  beyond the existing levels in the ratio of social expenditure to the
GNP cannot be regarded automatically as a good thing in itself. Only by
taking as a basis a certain conception  of society is it possible to decide the
desirable degree of transfer between different social categories (for example
betvreen the active and the retired, between the healthy and the sick and
between bachelor, small-family  and large-family units ), the priority to be
given to each type of transfer and the extent of the cover for specific
assured risks. The definition of a social poliry at Community  level pre-
supposes  agreement on these priorities, and this goes very deep into
conceptions of the quality of life among the populations involved.
3. Einployment
The increase  in the active population  has been materially  smaller than the
inctease in the total population. Causal factors include the ageing of the
population, for half the total increase in the population is due to the
growth in the number in the senior age-groups, and the extension of the
school-leaving  age, for between 1958 and 1970 the number receiving full-
time education rose fuom 25 to 33 million. The result is that the active
popuiation increased only from 74.2 to 75.6 million people, an increase
of 2Vo, and covering a fall of more than 2 million in Italy and a rise of
3.5 million in the other countries.
Though the total remained  coinparatively  steady, there were important
structural  changes. These included:
( a ) a decrease of 6 million in the number of self-employed  workers and
family helpers. This mainly affected the agricultural sector and the
commercial  and artisan trades, and there was an increase in the
number of self-employed in the rest of the tertiaty ( services ) sector.
On the other hand, the number of wage- and salary-earning workers
incteased by 9 million; and thus, against a growth of the active
39population of on,ly 2Vo,paid  r:mployment  rose by 1'7Vo (in the Nethet-
lands by asi muchi as 24Vo ). In 1970 wage- and salary-earners  acccrunted
for 78 Vo of t<>tal employment, as against 68 \Yo in 19t58. The
Community is tlLus approaching the rates of 92. Vo in the Urrited King-
dom and 90 Vo in the United States. A change ,cf this kind is not
without importance  for implementatioll  of an incomes policy.
( b ) the changes  bet'ween the main branches were very substantial, with
a falJ. of. 42Vo it:, agriculture  and a rise of l2Vo irr industnr, 2fiVo in
public administration and 20Vo in the other services. In individual
industries, some of the chaLnges were even bigger, includinl4, for
example,  zr diminution of 600 000 (60Vo ) in the number of iobs in
the collieries. TLre statistics,  urnfortunately,  do not permit of our going
into further detail. A particular  lack is any figure for the numl5er of
workers who changed jobs each year.
It rnight have been feared that thesre changes  would have had an urnfortunate
effect on the level of unemployment.  In actual fact the developmerLt  was
somewhat  moderated.  During thr: eady years the levell of unentplo\y'ment
shorved a consiclerable  fall in all the countries, more espccially in Italy. The
ratc rcached its lowes;t point in 1961; and since the:n its tendenc'y'has; been
to fluctuate around a somewhat higher figure which is, :nevertheless,  lower
than it was at the outset. The figures suggest that, in tlhe early stages, the
sudden fillip made it possible to absorb a considerable numt,er of un-
employed.  The outstanding cases were ftaiy, where 8Cl0 000 unemployed
rvere absotbed in six years, and France, where the numbers see.king work
shovred no increase  tin 1962-63, <lespite the repamiation from Algeria of
80C) 000 people of urhom 400 0C0 were economically active. Since this
time there have, been the beginnings  of large-scale recorrstruction  in indus-
try, resulting in a corrsiderable increose in the number of industrial dismis-
sals as a result of mergers,  specialization and conversion. It seems that
ftorn this time onwards  tl-rere has been a more notev/orthy  gap be:tween the
manpo\r/er  requrirements and the qualifications  of the :manpower offered,
one sign of which is the considerable  growth in the Clemand for foreign
manpower  and in the number  of vzLcancies  unfilled.
Further light is throrrrn on the nature of unemployment in the Community
by the analysis of the: problems raised by the shortage c,f manpower. The
mo,i/ements of lrorkers between one Community country and anotiher, which
were already appreciable  before L9.58, rose very sharply from 1960 on\vards,
even before all the obstacles to the free movement of labour had been
renLoved. Between 1960 and 1t965, the annual average was around
21C) 000 permanent .workers. After this the movement  slackerned  some-
40what, despite the facilities offered. In 1970 the number of workers o{
Conmunity  origin in jobs in Community  countries other than their own
was about 950 000. The largest contingent of these workets are Italians,
who account for 80Vo ot 90Vo of rnanDower misraticns inside the Commu-
nity.
Conversely,  the supply of manpower from non-member  countries showed
an almost continuous increase. Since 1962, they have exceeded the im-
migration of rvorkers from Community countries, and in 1969 they
nurnbered nearly 700 000 workers, or more than B}Vo of total immigration.
Thus, though the intra-Community  movements  of manpower have conri-
buted to the Community's economic expansion, they dld not make it possible
to absorb the pockets of unemployment or to satisfy the whole of the man-
power requirements.  This indicates that the free circulation of workers,
which is the indispensable foundation of economic integration,  cannot play
its appointed r61e as a catalyst in solving labour-market problems unless it
is integrated into an active employment policy. Jobs in the Community
offered to foreign workers are proving in fact more attractive  to rvorkets
from non-member countries than to workers vrithout jobs in the othet
countries  of the Community. This seems to indicate that there is no impor-
tant general problem of underemployment-except in Italy-but rather a
need for adapting  personnel to tl-re labour requirements of the market and
a need for measures  to promote the mobilitv of the available  Community
manpower.
The action taken by the Community  has been of various iypes  :
On the one hand, the economic-policy measures  ( see Chaptet 5 ) have
certainly not been without influence in keeping the tate of unemployment
at a comparatively  low level. The standing Committee on Employment,
set up in December 1970, has indeed begun work on the coordination  of
eiaployment policy in the mernber countries by harmonizing these policies
with the Community objectives.
As regards the measures to promote reconversion or rcadaptation, a dis-
tinction must be drawn betrveen the ECSC indusries  and the others. In
the ECSC industries the total number ernployed fell, over a 2}-yeat period
(19t2  7 L ), frcm 1.6 million to 1 million people; and this very considetable
reduction has necessitated  substantial intervention of a social charactef,
both at national and at Community  level. The latter has included recon-
version loans (250 million u.a.) which have helped to create 100 000 jobs,
and also readaptation  aids ( 156 million u,a. ) affecting ,{40 000 ECSC
rirorkcrs.
41Cornmunity acdon ha.s thus been ,of primary impottance in mitigating the
adverse effects of the rapid decline in an imponant industry whiclh, in some
cas€:s, was the Lrasic a,ctivity of a u,'hole region.
Fot the rest of the economy, the Iiuropean  Social llund was set up to pro-
mote employment  facilities insidr: the C,ommunity and the mobility of
workets, both geographically  and between different types of job.
Until 1 May 19t72 the Fund's action was limited to covering 5AVo <>f the
exp,enditure incumed by member countries or public bodies in providing
productive re-ernployrnent for unennployed  workers by vocational renaining
schemes and resettlernent aid. Over the period from .1. Januarll  1958 to
3L December 1971 the Fund gave assistance  in this field to ra toral of
210 million u.a,, in the form of payments made after ttre expenclitur,e  had
been incurred, for the benefit of 1 5 miliion unemployed  workersr. In this
initial phase, the Fund operated as an inter-state clearing fund for the
benr:fit of unem,ploye,l u'orkers,  according to no overall plan an,:l without
leaving scope for the lleast initiative by the Community itself.
Since 1. May 1972, the Social Fun,J has been basically reformed, for rvhich
indeed the EEC Treaty made express provision. It  is now an active
inst:rument of employment policy, and has increased resources  with rvhich
it should contribute  to the best possible utilization of all the active popu-
lation under a scheme of priorities laid down at Community level.
It is in vocational training that, ilespite the many efforrts put ilt hand at
various levels, ,results; have so far been the most slender. TIl,e general
guiclelines laid down by the Council in July 1971 should lead to better
prof;ress in the future.
lVe thus come to the conclusion, as in the previous chraptef, thrrt through
matters have not turned out quite as well as was hoped, they ha.ve ^t 
any
rate proved much better than was feared. The employrnent repercus,sions
have not in general been so grave ars some people expected;  and vrhen they
have been, as in the collieries, the machinery provided har; been able to miti-
gate them. Admittedly, the problems raised by changes  of job affecting many
workers have been serious, but these are inherent in the process of ecorromic
grolrth itsel{. lr rapicl rise in incorne is inseparable from profoun,C  changes
in the conditions of production; and if the Common Market contribut,ed  to
the former, it c,ruld not do so without giving rise to the latter. On the
other hand, the expe:rience  of the ECSC is extremely  instructi  re , for it
42proves that the change, and even the contraction, of an extremely  important
branch of activity can be organized if the financial  resources are available
and a cleat vievr is held of the development  rvhich is desirable in the branch
concerned. There is in this an example which might well be followed by
the Social Fund in its new form, provided it is given the necessary resources
and a concrete clefinition of the changes expected in the different fields of
activity.
In regard to living conditions, the results are more debatable. Despite the
considerable increase in average incomes of which the countries  of lTestern
Europe have had the benefit, they are nou'experiencing  feelings of dissatis-
faction. Undoubtedly some part is played in this by inequalities of income,
the inadequary of public infrastructtire, and growing fears about changes
which cannot be foreseen.  The uneasiness,  however, is deeper, re{lecting
present-day  Europe's complete uncertainty about the type of society to
which it aspires. This lack of objective explains both the national difficul-
ties in adapting the use of the national product, and the very narrowly
defined character of Community  achievements relating to living conditions.
It is only by intensive consultation  in the vadous quarters concerned (includ-
ing those which have no organized  spokesmen ) that it will be possible  to
ascertain the basic aspirations of the people, which are not always the same
as they wete 10 or 15 years ago. The Youth Conference and the Industry
and Society  Conference are the first milestones on this toad.
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flowards harmonious  development
'Ihe tasks assigned to the Comrnunity by Article 2 of the :freaty, are
halmonious developrnent,  balanced expansion  and an increase in stability.
They can be pursued in various directions. It may be a question  of ,orient-
ing; production to satisfy to the best advantage the private ,and public
requirements  of the Community. It may also be a question of development
whrich promotes  that distribution of incomes which is rr:garded as thr3 most
der;irable. Both these points u,e;re discussed  in the previous chaptet. It
ma.y also be a question of securing a cerrain harmony, both in time and in
space, in the pace of the development.  These are the two points to be
considered in t.his chrapter, in which we are concerned with regional equi-
lil-idr-rm and rvith controlling the business  cycle.
7. Regional eqelilibri'um
The concept of regional equilibrium does not {igure in the Treaty, either  as
an aspect of economic policy or a.s social policy. The idea that it may be
necessary  to d,eal rvith the devel,cpment of specific regions is mentioned
onliy in negative tefnts, as a ground for exceptions to the general. incr:mpat-
ibiliity with the Common Market of aid grantecl by individual governments.
Concetn with regional equilibi"iurn can in fact be tack.led eithe:r fro,m the
cconomic  or from the social stanclpoint.  In the forrner  case it becomes a
cprr:stlon of securiry; the most r:ffective employment of the fact,crs cf
ptoducti6n-manpolrer  and capital. At present,  apa:rt from the mines,
certain agricultural  products,  sorne of the heavy indr-rstties  and I'arious
services requi,ring very highll, t:rained personnel, the sponsors of new
establishnrents are virttraiiy free to choose their own sites. The obiective
factors of specialization and success are to be found much more in the
energy  and efficienqr of the {irm's executive teanr. T'his, hov.ever, does
not ntean that new i:nvestors  do not have a certain tenc[ency to go inrto the
44areas which are already the most developed, in which they have many
advantages for which they do not pay directly and some of which are
indeecl a charge on the community.  The very fact that the costs arising
ftom congestion  are estimated  at very high figures in some regions means
that greater production efficiency could be obtained  by spreading industrial
activity more evenly over the whole area.
From the social standpoint, the substantial  differences in income levels
betrveen  different  regions are regarded as unacceptable.  Nor is it consideted
that the transfer of whole populations from the poorer regions to those
g'hich are at present the richet rvould be a satisfactory way of restoring
the balance.
The Community countries,  mainly for social reasons but partly also for
economic reasons, have for the past 20 years been operating eithet a
regional policy or at least regional development schemes depending  chiefly
on the granting of aid.1
In this, as in other cases, Community  action might take the form of (a)
information, (b) harmonization  and coordination of national operations,
and (c) financial support. Action under (a) has been taken on quite
a number of occasions; it  has consisted of thorough studies on the
problems and ptospects in the various regions and comparison of the national
solutions. Under (b) the chief concetn has been to avoid costly and in-
efficient overbidding  against similar aid given in neighbouring regions but
lying in different countries: in 1971 an Agreement was reached on a com-
mon ceiling for the rates of grants which might be made at national level
in the centtal regions of the EEC. As regards ( c ) mention should be made
of the reconversion aids, especially those using the funds of the ECSC
(250 million u.a. in 1952-71 and loans from the European Investment
Bank amounting to 1950 million u.a. in 1959-71).  The results are by no
means negligible : indeed, the ECSC funds created over 100 000 jobs; but
the total amount  o{ money thus redistributed  remains quite small. In fact,
a Community policy of redistribution fot the benefit of the backward areas
has hardly been applied.z
It is estimated that the total amount of national aid in L970 was about 500 million
u.a. in Italy, 250 million u.a. in Germany,  200 million u.a. in Belgium,  100 million u.a.
in France and under 100 million u.a in the Netherlands. In the United Kingdom  in
1973-74 it rvill be 1 000 million  u.a.
It may be added that the agricultural policy has helped in raising incomes in the
pooreit regions,  for it is in these that the proportio! of the active population  engaged
in agticulture  is at its highest. It should be noted, however, that the aids which are
linked with price guarantees  (and these have recently absotbed about 90% of the
EAC'GF)  solve a current social problem  but scatcely conttibute at all to securing a
better employment structure in these regions,
45\{/hat then has happei:red during the past L2 or 1,5 years? In mo.re pr:ecise
terms, what has becorne of the fear expressed when the Romer Trr:aties
were signed that the process of forming  the common Market miglLt benefit,
essentially, that famous industrial 'tiangle' which cornprises  ttre central
regions of the Community, and thLat the peripheral  regions might e:rpect
to see yet more ,ceterioration  in the,ir position, which was far frorn go,rd in
any case?
A first and rather genr:ral reply to t.hese questions may be given b,1 cornpar-
ing rrhe developrnents in five territorial  groupings:
(a) the industrial  'triangle' Lille-Amsterdam-Diisseldorf, which is the home
of one out of fiv,e of the Community's  inhabitants;
(b ) a ring round this triangle in Germany  and the Benelux countri.es ( l07o
of the population);
(c) the Paris Easin and north-rvestern Italy (L2o/b). These fiirst three
areas compnise  thre 'European crescent', containing ,l3Vo of the popu-
lation;
(d) the peripheral reg;ions-wgstern  and south-western  lirance, the eastern
and southern regions of the Fecleral Republic of Germany,  and southern
\ta7y (20Vc, of the population);
(e) the rest of rthe Community,  which is the home of a good third o:f the
population  and rromprises  reigions of various  characters, with the
common characteristic that their population  ,Jensity and degree of
industrialization  is below the average.
So farr as population is concerned,  the relative changes  have been smrall. The
most that can be notecl is a slight rr:duction in the peripheral regions a.nd a
rise in regions (b ) and (c). on the other hand, the contribution  which each
region makes to the community's  gross domestic product has undergone
substantial charges. These may be summarized as followsr :
(i)  the share of the industrial 'triangle' seems to be slightly declini'g. In
particular  the share of North Fihine-Westphalia  has fallen apprreciably;
(ii)  the share of the pr:ripheral  regirns is practically unchrrnged;
(iii) dre shate of the ring around the indusrial'triangle'is  increasing very
substantialll', having risen from llVo to 16Vo of the total;
(iv) neither the Paris Basin nor north-western  Italy show any chan6;e in
their comparative positions;
(v) the conpara,tive  share of the'rest'is suffering a decrease.
46In production per head, the industrial'triangle'is losing part of its lead, but
the relative backwardness of the peripheral tegions remains as it was'
The general impression  is that dudng the past 12 years there has been littie
change in the compararive position of the old indusffial  regions and the
peripheral regions. The old regions did not monopolize  the benefits of the
Common X{arket's formation, probably  becattse  their industries  are those
of siow growth, or even in decline,  and the new indqstries went and estab-
lished themselves on the fringe of this triangle, which was already very
populous,  choosing those areas that offer the most flexibility in making the
arrangements. In the peripheral  regions, regional policy has successfully
prevented backwardness from growing worse, but it has not reversed  the
situation.
Norv that there is so much insistence on the need for a Community regional
policy, it is worth enquiring seriously why success has been so slight. In
particular, it might even tg asked whether the instruments chosen for the
purpose were in fact the best available. It is striking that, particularly  in
the early stages, much more stress was laid on financial aid designed as an
inducement  for the setting up of new establishments  than on ptoviding an
attractive econornic  and social infrastructute of on secufing payment for
the real cost of creating a new job in areas rvhich were alteady fully occupied
of even congested.  Such a stfategy, which is politically the easier, probably
leads to quicker results but does not get to the root of the problem. Morc-
ovef, it uses fesources  rvhich cannot be kept in play indefinitely,  because the
resulting charges on the budget would be very heavy'
It is probable that in each individual coun6y it seemed imprudent to lay
undue burdens on firms in the congested  areas, for these firms were in many
cases bearing the brunt of competition with the other Common Matket part-
nefs. On the other hand, action on these lines but fully concefted at Com-
munity level does not pfesent the same dtawbacks. \flhere regional te'
balancing is stimulated by differences  in the costs of installation  and opera-
tion between regions, recourse  to the two'fold policy of taxing some regions
and aiding others would probably produce more substantial  results without
laying too heavy a burden on the Community  Budget, which is also under
pressure for measures to raise the quality of life.
2. Conjunctural (i.e. sbort-terrn economic) equilibriun
Reference in the Treaty to balanced expansion  and increased stability have
been interpreted in all the countries as implying the maintenance of full
employment  and stable prices in a general expansion movement.  The
A1equilibrium of the balance of payme,nts, rvhich is stipulated by Article 104,
is a necessary condition for this, but far from sufficient  in itself. The per-
form,ance during the last 15 years can therefore be measured against three
main criteria-regularity  of grorvth, maintenance of a low unemploynnent
rate, and approximate stability in prices, taking into account the cha:nges
in the balance of payments.
Two ma;'or questions deserve examination.  These are:
(a) in theory, the union of two economies, in which th,: fluctuations are
not in phase with one another,  may have the effect o,f regularizing; the
business cycle in both countries, since the booming market in the one
would cause addidonal demand to arise in the sluggish economy of the
other, thus helping to stabili::e prices in the first and to increase
employment  in the second. There are also serious  reasons for thidking
that this development of trade rrrould tend to prornote approximation of
economic  trends in the countries linked in this way, leadin,g to the
development of a common trend. Two what extellt have the lracts
borne out this analysis? Has the formation ol the European Ciom-
munity, by opening frontiers to the rnovement  of goods, people and
capital, helped or complicated the solution of short-term econc,mic
problems?
(b) the member counries are reqtiired by the Treaty to'regard their
r:onjunctural policies as a matter of common concern' and to consult
one another  and tlee Commission  on the measures to be taken to rCeal
'with particular  circumsrances.  During the past 75 yearc Cornmunity
rrction has i:ncluded the development of an appropriate  inst.itutional
lframervork,  the r:ornpiling of an inventory, the compari:;c'  and
rlevelopment of the instruments  of short-term  economic  policy,  and
concrete action b,r recommeniLations  for the measr_Lres to tre taken
in the differ,3nt  member countries. What have been the most imlpor-
tant of these measures,  and what has been their probable influence on
the economic  situ,ation?
Thoulgh  the phenomenon is not very cleady marked, it can be estimaLted  rrhat
fluctuLations have been somewhat less wide during the period beginning
in 1958 than the'y were in the previous years. This comparative masrtery
of the business cycle is also to be fouLnd in non-member countries, so that it
cannot be regarded as peculiar to the Community.
The rnost pronounced  iiluctuations rvere in Germany and ltaly, including,
mole especially, two periods of ver.,' sluggish  economic  trend, in Italf in
I9(>4 and in Germany in 1967. In both these counties the fluctuations
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50were particularly sharp as regards the rate of investment, whose gtowth
rate (at constant prices), was much more irregular than in the other
countries. France, on the other hand, has been making very regular pro-
gress not only in GNP but also in the main categories  of final demand
(private consumption, public consumption and investment).  Belgium and
the Netherlands are in an intermediate position, with a tegular growth in
plivate consumption and investment fluctuations of a more disordered
kind.
There is a tendency towalds approximation of the business curves, especially
between France, Germany and Belgium. They are still quite similar
betrveen  France  and Belgium  and also between Belgium  and the Nethedands.
Italy, on the other hand, continues to show a gteatet  degree of independence
in its short-term economic development.  At times the approximation  ob-
served goes materially further than would have been expected  from the
increase in ffade, so that various factors (including  transactors' expecta-
tions ) must have contributed to it.  In any case the correlation  between
internal  dernand and imports from other Community countries has become
closer in Germany, France and Italy, which results in the internal fluctua-
tions being the more forcibly transmitted to the other member coLrntries
and thus enhances the responsibility of the larger countries  towards the
other partners in the Community.
The course events have taken suggests that, in the fitst yeafs, the association
of the different  countries helped each of them in ironing out its fluctuations,
but that since about 1967 or 1968 the fluctuations  have been in phase and
the former effect of spontaneous stabilization has less impact.
The unemployt?xent  rate, as indicated in the previous chapter,  has shown a
tendency  to decrease, and since 1964 the fluctuations  have not been very
marked.
Prices,  however, have shown an average  rise of about 4Vo per annum for
the Community  as a whole, covering a 3.2Vo rate for Belgium and about
4.7Vo for the Nethedands.  There were tv'o breakaway  periods, the first
of which was in 1963-64, especially in Italy and the Netherlands. This
however, petered out quite quickly as a result of energetic measures taken in
the two countries.  The second has continued  since L969 and is still in
progress.  The moderate  rise in the earlier years has often been explained
by the existence of available  reserves of manpower,  which facilitated  rapid
production growth in a number of industries without employers bidding
against one another for labour. It may be added that the transactors did
not have the idea that their expenditure could increase by 4Vo or 5Vo in
51real t,erms each y,ear, and therefore that their demand  expectations  would
remain compatibl: withL the physical possibilities of t;he growth in supply.
Moreover, the opening of the fronti,ers had increased the real or poten,tial
compr:tition to 'which firms vrere sul5ject  and thus ga,ve them an incentive
to priidence in raising their prices. In 1963-64 several member  countries,
especially  Italy, the Nethedands and Belgium, went through a p,eriocl in
whiclL the price rise woLs gathering rnomentum; and in Italy this tendency
was trccompanied by a more-than-n,rrmal deterioration in the ba.lance of
payments.
The Commission  had akeady indicated in 1963 the danger inheren,t in the
nascent inflation zrnd proposed  measures to deal with it.  The anti-jnflation
measures in several of the member countries before the beginning of 1964
were not successfr-rl in g;etting rid of the imbalances;  and in April 1964 the
Counr:il accordingly  adopted  a Recommendation  proposed by the Cornrnis-
sion inviting the membet countries to operate  a strict stabilization  policy.
This r;hort-term  econornLic policy Recommendation  was rernarkable  fcr two
reasons. For the first time in the Clommunity a Joint De,cision  laid down
priarit'ies between the economic policy objectives ancl genetal quantitatiue
standards. The measures taken by the different countries., especially ltaly,
on the lines of this Recommendation  were effective enough to avoicl having
to carry through the procedure whicle had been initiated under Article l08
of the Treaty, ancl it did not become necessary to call for mutual  asrsistance
frorn thc other mcmber  countries.
The jnflationary  tenderncy in 1963-64 slowed down in 1965, but cnme
more vigorously to life in 1968 in France and around 1969 in the other
Comntunity countries.
In France, the May-June  social crisis in 1968 caused a speed-up in the rise
in pri,:es and-largely as a result of the flight of capital-produced  a serious
rvorsening in the balance of payments. The Commission  accordingly  made
Recornmendations proposing  to give France the benefit of. wutual as'sista'nce
under Article 108 of the Tieaty. The Council approved this proposal. ithe
practical steps taken under the Directive  include the recovery  nteasures
decided on by the: Italian Government during the second half of 1968, the
issue rln the German matket of variotrs loans expressed in Dleutschmarks and
issueil by French publi,c organizations, and a policy which lasted at least
until December 1968 of comparatively lorv interest rates in all:member
count:ries except Ftance.  The combirred  effect was to steadlr the position,,
Since 1969, howevet,  the Recommendations  made to cornbat the gen,eral
acce{eration  in the rise jn prices have,, unlike their predece,ssors,  had practi-
52cally no e{fecr. The inflation of the past four years had in fact taken place
in a context rvhich makes acrion much more difficult. Technological
changes over last 10 years have been so fat-reaching that the unemployed
manpower often proved ill-adapted to the jobs which became available'
Ihere is thus a certain degree of unemployment and there are at the same
tirne vacancies  which are not filled ( stagflation ).  Competition  inside the
Community does not seem to be having the same modetating  effect as before.
Tiris does not lnean that there has been any special violation of the Treaty
competition-rules,  but there has been a spontaneous  growth of general
inflationary behaviour. Transactors afe now convinced that there will
probably be a rise of about 4Vo or 5Vo a year in real terms and this leaCs
everybody to ask for mofe 'so as to catch up'. Moreovef,  the effectiveness
of monetary  measures is greatly diminished by the existence of an immense
and compietcly  uncontrolled  international capital matket, the balances of
r'"'hich can vcry quickly become  mobile.
The third rnedium-term  economic policy programme called attention to some
of these points and emphasized especially the need fot 'seeking, in con-
cert vith both sides of industfy,  the means which rvill ensufe a growth
in incomes and prices better adapted to the requirements of the balanced
development of the economy'. The Werner Report had also emphasized
that the insttuments for national action had lost some of their effectiveness
s,ithout their tasks having been taken over by sufficiently powerful Com-
murlity insttuments.
Various rneasures have already been taken. For instance, the reform of the
Social Fund and the creation of the Employment Committee should help in
the adaptation of manpowef to the jobs available; the Decisions  aimed at
stfengthening the collaboration between the authorities responsible {or the
cconomic onl .on"tury policies rvill improve the coherence of national
actions. But these measufes remain quite inadequate;  the coofdination
of economic policies is still in tl-re initial stages, especialiy  because it implies
u., ug.""*"r-rl  about priorities in the 'magic triangle' rvhich is far from
materializing.  The last three yeafs have shown that the Govetnments are
slow in declding to take essential measules. Over and over again the
insufficiency of the Decisions adopted has had to be demonstrated by bittet
experience tefore a step forward was made. It was necessafy to establish
rhe fact that the floating of the DM $/as not enoggh o a bar to speculation
before the principle of fixed, but adjustable, parities, supplemented by
measures  of rnutual assistance,  could be accepted. It was also necessary
to note that this, too, 1yas not sufficient, and to recognize that the crises
did not derive fron the structural  imbalance  of the fates of exchange  but
53$rete €ssentially oI a speculative nature, in order, pending the reforrn of the
international  monetary system, to envisage adoption of the two flreasures
Iikely to maintain a minimum of stat,ility in the Communiry, that is; ro say,
a concerted floating of r:urrencies ais-i-uis the outside countries ancl a s[art
with control of the movements of flc,ating capital.
How :many more crises .vill be required  before Europe gives itself a genuine
monetarv  aLltonomv?
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The Communitv and the rest of the wodd
At the beginning of a chapter on relations between the Community and
the rest of the wodd it must first be put on record that the Treaty objectives
are presented  here in very general terms. The field covered is one which
is closely linked with foreign poiicy and in which it is therefore prudent to
avoid entanglement  in advance in unduly precise statements. The devant
texts are chiefly concerned with the ptogressive  elimination  of resffictions
on international  trade and with solidarity  between  the Community  and the
Overseas Countries and Territoties. The main instruments specifically  men-
tioned are the setting up of aCommonCustomsTati{f , a common commercial
policy in dealings with non-member  countties, procedures  to mitigate dis-
equilibria in the balance o{ payments, and association with the Overseas
Countries and Territories with a view to increasing  trade and pursuing of
a joint campaign of economic and social development.
In practice, the Community has been confronted  duting its existence, in
common with other countries, with four great international  economic pto-
blems. These are:
(a) the liberalization  of world trade;
(b) contdbution to the development  of the developing  countries;
(c) the re-establishment of a u'orld monetary  otder;
( d ) the choice of the attitude  to be taken in respect of foreign investments
and in respect of the part to be played by multinational  companies.
The first thtee of these problems  have been raised and debated in interna-
tional organizations,  the fourth has only been touched upon. Only the first,
however,  has yet received a faitly substantial  answ'er.  Since all four of these
problems  are extremely  important, it would be as well to identify the
reasons for the absence of response to three of them, and to see how far
the Community has suffered from this.
55The following e:Kamination will, therefore, be cenlled on four esse.ntial
questions:
(i)  how wete the Common Custoims Tariff and the common commercial
poiicy brought into existence aLnd what v/ere the ef{ects on the Com-
munity's external  trade?
( ii ) how was the bala.nce of paymr:nts  achieved between the CommuLnity
and the rest of th,: world?
(iii) what action has the Community taken to help the developing
countries?
(iv) what contribution has the Cornmunity  made to the organization and
administtation  of international economic relationship?
L, C;ustoms Tarilf , contrnercial polic:y  and. external trade
The essential  Communit)'  Decisions in these matters  have been of three
kindr;. To begin with, as specified in the Treaty, a Common  Custc,m Tariff
was lSrought into operation to repla,ce the national tariffs. This rvas done
two years ahead of the initial dateline. Secondly, the Community  played
a decisive part in the international discussions aimed at reducinp; the ob-
stacles to trade and, rnore particularly, tariff barriers. In this connection
the fact that the Comrnunity  spoke institutionally  and with a single l'oice
certainly played an imy;ortant part in its success in a field which is rather
closelly connected with foreign policy. Finally, especially  during the last
two or three yeerrs, a series of tracle agreements have been mad,: with a
considerable number oli non-member  countries.
Tv'o questions alise in connection  rvith these Decisions.  One, which con-
cerns the outside worlcl, is whether the attitude adopted reflects a turning-
in upon itself by the Community ,or an opening-up tovrards the outside
world. The other, which concerns the Community,  is whether a r:eal com-
mercial policy can be said to exist.
On the first quesrtion the Community has repeatedly  stated that, in confor-
mity vrith the Treaty, and in direct c,ontradiction  to various allegations made
in outside countriies,  its commercial policy is one of a widely open chararcter.
This claim is in fact corrfirmed by a number of statistical  indicatofs.
In the first place, exa,mination  by a GATT working pany of the tariff
situartion  as it will app€:ar when all tlhe Kennedy  Round Decisions have been
implemented has shovn that the Community tariff is tlhe lowest  among
the lrorld's great trading powers.
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The average position does not, of coutse, exclude the possibility that the
Community  duties may, in the case of some individual products,  be higher
than those of other counries; but this case only means that the level in the
other instances is all the lower.
It is also to be noted that the formation of the European  Community  has
been accompa-nied  by an intensification of relations with non-membet
countries. Its share in wodd trade (average of exports and imports)  rose
fromlT.5Vo in 1958 to 19Vo in1970. This proportion is similar to that
of the United States, double those of the United Kingdom  and Japan an,l
four times that of the USSR. The Community has thus become the rvorld's
greatest ttading group.
1X/hat products have been specially concerned  in this increase in trade?
The Community, like many industrial countries, is an importer of many
raw materials and of energy, and is an exporter,  essentially,  of processed
goods. It will be found, however,  that the imports of energy and raw
materials have increased less rapidly than total imports, for their share
of the total has fallen ftom 47Vo to 37Vo. On the other hand, the share
represented by manufactured  goods has increased fuom 287o to 45Vo, while
capital goods have risen from 9Vo to I4Vo. Not only is the Community
not a ciosed shop, but it has played an increased  part in the trade in finished
industrial products which, in principle, reflects a certain international
specialization.
This development  is the more noteworthy for the f.act that an economic area
the size of the Community  would be capable of making practically all the
indusrial goods it requires. The only exceptions of any importance seem
to be long-distance  sub-sonic aircraft and certain types of highly specialized
Semi-
manufactures
Finished
goods
6.0
7,7
9.7
7.6
0.6
3.8
5.5
r.2
6.1
8.1
12.0
6.2
8.3
9.3
8.3
Source: 'Analysls  of tariffs'  GATT 1971.machiner:y  and apparatus. The imtrrorts which are strictly necessarry  tl'rete-
fore comprise:
(a) various agricultural and food products, especially those of tropical
origin;
(b) most raw rrraterials;
(c) a large part of its,energy;
(d) the various manu[actured  aticles mentioned above.
This 'strict necessity' list covered 60Vo of the total imports in 1969 as
compared  withT5Vo  irr 1958. The rest, which reflects world specialization
in certain lines of production and a desire for variety among lluropean
consumefs, thus rose from 25Vo to 40Vo of the total.
It should also be noted that the ratio of impots lrom outside ,countries
to ttLe Community  GIrIP is 1,27o. This compares with c'nly 5.59',: for: the
Urrit,:d States an,l l0V6 for Japan.
The accusation  sometines  made against the Community of practising a
certain protectionism is therefore v'holly unfoundect,  especially if its atti-
tude is compared. with that of other leading partners  in wodd trade.
ff w,: are thinking in terms of an attitude deliberately open to th,e outside
worl,C-and thetefore  a priori favourable to non-member countries--is  it
possible to speak. of a real common  commercial  policy? llhis is tbe ser:ond
quesr[ion,  and the ansrr'er is less definite and less positive, for co.mtnercial
policy reflccts both a foreign policy-and therefore seeks special cleve-
lopment of links with particul4l  qeunllies-and an industrial policy, through
which it seeks to prornote the development  of specific lines of production,
or to organize a decrease in others. The several dozen trade agreernents
concluded with non-member  countries do not yet reflect any rcal foreign
policy, and the granting of generalized preferences was not closeJ.y geared
to an indusffial  policy ,vhich had been defined  as regards its sectoral aspects.
In actual fact the abse:rce  of foreigrr policy discussions at Community  Jlevel
has led to the si.gning of trade agreements as the opportunity  arose, and
primnrily under the in{luence  of the general desire to take an open attitude
towards the outside world. This ir; a state of things which the liuropean
Parliament has often regretted.
It wrrs not till September t972that an overall conception  was worked out.
Even so, it covered  only one region of the world-the Meilitertaneain an?a-
but this does at least teflect oriorities in the establishment  of relations with
non-member countries.
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aspects,  has also prevented ihere being any reference  framework for the
p.,rpor" of tracle negotiations; and the risk is, that the compromises arrived
at rnay be dictated more by shoft,term problems than by cievelopments
vrhicl-r rvould be desirable in the medium term. One of the lessons of
experience in the first years of the EEC, however, was that most of the
fears expresseil in the different sectors proved exaggerated, and that in
general the adjustments  have been easier than was expected.
2. The balance ol payments
The Cornmunity's balance of transactions in goods and services vdth the
rest of the wodd has been consistently in credit throughout the 1958-70
period. It has amounted  in all to about $ 45 000 million' lWhat use has
been made of this balance?
The first heading is private and, more especially, public unilateral transfers.
The accumulated total of these is $ 18 000 million. It consists primarily
of public aid to developing  countries.
The second heading consists of non-monetafy movements  of capital'
Against a total foreign investment in the Community of $ 26 000 million,
the Community  investments in the rest of the world amount to $ 42 000
million.
During the past five years the principal countries to rvhich these invest-
ments w.ere directed v/ere the developing countries and the United States;
and the latter is also the principal source of the foreign jnvcstment  made
in the Community.
Finally, the balances in gold and foreign currencies are seen to have increas-
ed by about $ 19 000 million over the 1'958-70 period. The sum of
these outgoings exceeds the resources  by about $ 8 000 million, which is
the total shown in the Community  balance of payments under 'errors and
omissions'.
The last item shows the impact on the Community's  assets of the function-
ing of the international monetary system. The gold exchange standard with
a single dominant crlrrency resulted, over the past 12 yeats, in an impo-
verishment  for the Community to an extent of the sarne order of magnitude
as the increase in the Community product in one recent year, or the whole
of the GNP of Belgium, or the entire public aidpaid over the 12yearcby
the Community countries to the developing countries.
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less an indir:ation of the orders of magnitude  involved and the need for
,considerable  modi.fications in the rules of the game ( see belorv ).
). Relations witb tbe deuelopingcountries
'Ihis aspect has recently been dealt with in the Commission memorandum
on a Commlurity tr;oiicy for development  cooperation.
,A large part of th,e action was taken by the member  countries themselves,
rLn the form of financial and technical  cooperation.  In 19691 all the
countries reached  the tafget of transferring to the develop:ing  countries
at least lVo of their GNP, inr:luding public and private aid. T'he same
cannot be said of the target of 0.7Vo in the form of public aid. On this
point there are quite consiclerable differences between the member countries.
lfhele are also rather considerable differer-rces in the division o{ the bilateral
public aid betr-,'eerL  l3rants and loans and in the tems on whir:h the public
loans are granied. The volume ,of the aid, too, has shown quite considerable
variations from year to year.
ifhese divergencies are a refle,ction, firstly, of allowance  rnade by the
rnember countries for internal pressures of a historical,  economic  and poli
tical kind rr'hich are often different,  and secondly, of the abrsence ol any
sufficient coordination between the bilateral policies.
T'he action at Comrnunity level is of thrce kinds:
( i )  association  with the Africar:L states and Madagascar.  This has g;radually
assume a character  going far beyond the simple implernentation  of
technican and financial aid and measures of tade preference. It thus
expresses a reaLl political oprrion of developing  special relations l5et'ween
Europe rand Africa south oit the Sahara. The most apparent  financial
aspect is to be found in the successive appropriations for tlle European
Development lFund. The {irst EDF, decided on by the Rome Treary,
had resources  ,cf 580 million u.a. The second EDF was created under
the first Yaoundd Conve:ntion in 7963, and its resources were
730 million u.a. plus a further 70 million u.a. made available, by the
Eufopean Investment Bank. The third Ef)F w,as set up under the
I  second ]laoundd Convention in 1.970, and its resources are 900 mil-
lion u.a. plus ,a further 100 million u.a. from the EIB. In the past
few years the annual expenditure has been at the rate ol! about 140
I The first provisional  information available for 1,970 sh<>ws a decline in the financial
contribution c,f some of the membet: countries by comparison with I96|V.
60million u.a.) as compared with the national product of the countries
r.ided which is around 8 000 million  u.a.
(ii) thc fc.rmaticn of special links g.ith most of the counlies on the Medi-
terranean seaboard.
(iii) gra.duai extension of trade preferences to all the developing  countries.
All these measures  reflect the same desire to stfengthen the Community's
coopefation  in the cievelopment of tire poorer countfies. Nevertheless, they
cannot ;,et be described as a real dci'elcpment-aid policy. Thete ate in fact
three scuLces of incohetence or difficulty:
(i )  there is no overall deliberaticn  at Community  ievel on the choice of
the best instrurnents for aiding the developing countries, nor is there
any systematic coinparison  o{ the commitments  or action contem-
platecl, either at national levei (especially as regatds technical  an-l
iinancial  cooperation ) or at Community  level (especially  through the
commercial policy). This prevents  the aid given from having its maxi-
m11m e{fect, and it also prevents  the views of the coi::rmunity in inter-
national  conferences from having the full weight which might attach
to them as being the views of the biggest trading partner of the deve-
loping countfies and the provider  of more than a third of the total aid
given by industrial countries. The lack of predetermined Community
attitudes, put forrvard and defended by a single spokesman,  has been a
rnanifest impediment for the Community countties in playing any
211rrrp,-i^rnle nati in ttrre successive UNCTAD  negotiations;  and it may qyI.rL,-rsur!  fqr!  I
-.11 llur,. prevented  the emergence of various  conclusions which might
have mitigated the immense disappointment felt by the participating
countries from the Third Vorld. Though the Community has not
snffered  an.v direct economic  dame.ge through this, it has certainly
affected its political image. This is the mote regrettable because the
value and effectiveness  of single fepfesentation  fot the Community
as sttch has already been proved by the Kenned;' Round experience'
(ii) the maintenance  of special relations with the AASM is difficult to
reconcile with the generalized trade preferences. The choice lies be-
tween a progressive  loosening of the privileged character of the rela-
tions with the AASM or their maintenance by giving the AASM more
technical  and financial aid. A decision on this point cannot be evaded
much longer.
(iii ) where the development of the developing countties is to take place
thtough the diversification of their economies and the increase in
tl-reir exports of goods which will compete witl'r some Community
piocli-rcts, the situation calls for an adaptation of the Community
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need to,be closely coordinated r.rith industrial policy anc[ the channel,
ling of the activity of the Social Fund. The need for such coordinationL
is recol;nizcd in principle, but it is still far from havinLg been satis-
factoril;r implemented in practice.
'*. Organization ol international  econonic relations
I{ou. that we have discussed  th,3 question of aid to developing; counffies, it
remains for r-rs to mention the international  monetary  order, foreign invest-
rnents and muitinational firrns.
4.1. The world monetary oystem
llhe first cracks in the 30-year-old Bretton Woods edifice \sere seen by
specialists a decade, or more ago.
llhe basic faults in the dominant cunency standard  srere sumfilarized with
great claity by Prr:fessor  Tri{fi:n:
(a) so long as the dominant currency is still convertible in fact into go1d,
the balarnce of payments discipline can operate, but with conv(3rtibility
crises which will shake the economic foundations of all ceuntries;
(b) if this dominant currency should become inconv*tible, eithel de iure
or de locto ir will becorne  an uncontrollable instrument c'f world
inflation, for lt will oblige the other countries to provirJe unlimited
finance for tlLe external deficit of the dominant currency counrry.
The system ailounts to a positive subsidizatiorr by the othr:r coun-
ties (over g ,10 000 million from the Six since 1958).
In addition to this, but not independent of it, is the progressive  develop-
nrent of an international money market (and, on a rnore modest scale, a
finance markr:t) wJhich, by comparison with the national money markets,
has the peculiarity  of not being under the control of any public authority
(rtO 000 million Euro-dollars in I97t\.
The Community  ha.s suffered {rom these upsets and anomalies in several
clifferent wayrs.  I
In the first place the 'seignioriarl rights'have cost in 15 years ffrc're than
g 20 000 million, v.hich could h,ave been applied otherwise to mucli better
effect. ;  ''.,i;:ll
M.uch more iimportant, however, are the obstacles  this monetary  sysrem
puts in the way of policies of strort-term economic control. T'ransmission
62t,through the intermediary of the Euro-dollar market results in a certain
subjeJtion of the European central bank rates to the Euro-dollar rate,
which is itself influen."i by the Federal Reserve rate. It is quite generally
appreciated  that the Euro-dollar is an inflationary  factor tending to pre-
j,rii.e th. stability of European economies; and the ill effects from which
,h"r" ..ono-ies suffer are issentially atributable to the disparity of scale
between the American economy and the sepafate  economies of Europe'
The way outn of coufse, lies in the formation of a tftle monetary union,
the broad lines of which were sketched in the \Terner Plan and put into
concfete form in commission  drafts which led to the Agreement  of
g February L971. The events of May 1971, however, defened implemen-
tation of certain points in this Agreement  ( the narrowing  of the margins
of fluctuation); and the Agreement is thefefore still in the very early
stages of its application, while the problems are growing more and more
acute.
4.2. Foreign investments  and multinational  firms
The rate at which cross-frontier  investments are increasing is materially
faster than the growth in the GNP and in the investments  carried out in
the territory of an individual counly. This means that there is a growing
tendency towards the internationalizatian  of producers. ft is estimated
that the proportion of induslial capital held by foreignets exceeds 157o
inltaly und i. ur high as 20%o in Germany. According to some estimates,
in tsi 5 more than- a third of the indus6ial production of the western
world, excluding  the United  States, will come from subsidiaries of American
firms. Even though other forecasts point to a substantial growth in
European  investment in Europe, this development  cannot fail to raise
probi.mr. They are summed up by George Ball: 'How car a.national
!ou".n-"rr, -o.k ont 
".t ".orro-ic 
plan with any certainty if a board of
Iir=.to., meeting some 5 000 miles away is in a position,  by_changing  its
purchasing and production  policy, to influence decisively  the country's
L.ono-i. life?' The same question can be asked substituting  'Community'
for'national  govefnment''
The development  of multinational fitms, and more particularly the interest
they have increasingly shown, for 10 years or more, in the countries  of
E.rrop., have substantially modi{ied the basic data of some of the Com-
mrrniiy;, economic  problems and the scope of some of its measures'  So
*hut l, the use of minor adillstments  to customs tariffs, which may raise or
reduce import prices by 2Vo ot 3Vo, when the foreign. subsidjaries of
American iompani.t  have a turnover which is six times the total exports
from the United States and the same will shortly apply to Japanese firms?
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Eiuropean  firrns which sell half or two-thirds of their products ourrside the
Community  either by exporting; them or by manufar:turing tJhem through
subsidiaries in non-member counries? what is the value of. aid to a
branch of industry doing a total business of 20 or 30 million u.a.,
or regional aid to a total of a fe'w hundred million u.a.. in the face of firms
v'ith an annual tuf:nover of 1 octo million u.a. of more, and a gfoss annual
profit of around 100 million u.a. a year? rVhat can be the effect of a
monetary policy aimed at making a change by lT%o, that is to say, by
15 000 million u.a., in the Community's  monetary stock, when th,e world
lras a stock of around 50 000 rnillion 1r.^., a Targe part of u'hich, can be
set in motion at \/ery short n,rtice, largely by the decisions of finance
d'3partments in the multination:ll  companies?
Examination of the problems pc,sed by the appearance  of these companies
9n the Euro;rean s,cene, with decision-making  centes of such importance
lccated nutsicle the confines of Europe, has remainecl ta.boo. rt .was not
until July 19',72,wtrcn the'Rey Report'was  tabled in the OECD, that the
question was raisecl in all its rrragnitude  in any official body, This is a
fir:ld in which the delay between the appearance of the probllem and the
dercision to tackle it has been particulady great.
It is the very success of the c'mmon Market, in te'ms of efficiency  in
production, which has given so much importance to the i.nternational
problems with whi;h it is faced. By the Lact that it has become the
wrdd's foremost trading power, its responsibilities  have increasr:d,  not
orrly in world trade, but also aisi-ois the developing countries. It is also
an area of prosperiqr, and thus has attracted into its rrLidst the subsidiaries
of foreign companies.  The Treaty, which was primarily drawn up to
oty-anize the functioning of the c,ommon  Market, provided trn 
"*pli.it answer to these questions, except in the setting up of the Common  Customs
Tarci{f and the principle that, after the initial transition period, there should
be a common commercial policy. The fact that moJt of these external
economic prot,lems are closely linked with foreign policy explairrs why
progress in dealing with them has been much slower, and lrence more
mcdest in soope, than the progress made in effr:cting the internal
changes in the' community itself. The fact remains that the corLtinued
fashioning of Iiurope will very quickly be blocked if these nevr prr:blems
are not tackle<I and resolved with a degree of care commensuratr: with
their scale and importance.
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Fifteen years ago, when the Treaty of Rome was signed, the economic and
social future of the Community  countries were matters both of hope and
of anxiety.
The hopes were expressed with paticular vigour by most economists,
many politicians and a number of business  leaders and trade unionists.
Two points were specially emphasized. On the one hand, people looked
for a profound change in production structures which would enable the
improvements in efficiency arising thtough greater specialization and
economies of scale to be exploited to the full. Secondly,  they expected
that a rcal European  economic entity could be very quickly constituted and
that inside it ideas would crystallize about the European society of tomor-
tow and the r6le Europe should play in the wodd; at the same time, a
minimum  degrce of political union would make it possible to worlc actively
for the achievement of such a society and to face outside countries with
a common attitude on tJee pafi of. the counlies of Europe concerning all
majot problems.
The anxieties  were felt mote especially by vatious people in direct every-
day contact with realities.  Many business leaders feated that the opening
of the frontiers to the passage of goods, the free movement of capital
and freedom of establishment, might result in unduly abrupt changes in
the supply of panicular types of goods and thus bting about the need for
a thorough suuctural reorganization of firms. Trade unions feared that
the same factors might lead to large areas of unemployment and necessi-
tate the retraining  and resettlement of large numbets of wod<ers in condi-
tions which rvould be all the more difficult because  pfeparations  would
not have been made far enough in advance. And the administtations
feared that the reduction of national powefs might lead to difficulties  in
managing  economic trends and in wotking towatds gteater harmony
between diffetent regions.
Experience  has shov,'n that both the good and the bad expectarions  were
excessive. The formation of the Common Market has not caused the
65upheavals which some people {eared; and thougtr the.re have been appreci-
able shi{ts in many trade flows, no real disturbances have occtrred., except
in a few instances where ill effects were, in arry case, mitig,ated by the
application od safeguard measures. It  has been possible to continue
controlling  econornic trends at least as effectively as in previous years,
and there har; been no increase in the regional imbalances. ,At tlhe same
time, economic grovith continued at a rapid pace, making possible  at greatef
innprovement in standards of liv.ing than in any of the other westem coun-
tlies, and the opening of the frontiers has put a much greater variety of
strpplies at the disposal of the consum€f. Industrial rcorganiztatiorl across
the frontiers,  however, is still on a small scale, and for a nurnber of
industrial gocds it is not possible to regard the market as Jhaving been
unified at all. Preparation for the future, through a joint research policy
and harmonized  regional concepts, is still in its eady stages; the monerary
union is advancing 'cnly slowly, and now and then goes into reverse. The
common attitudes to the major international  prob.lems-wlhethr:r  they
concern the creation of a new world monetafy system or the contribution
to the develcpment of the underdeveloped countries-are still in the
drafting stage,
Clrronologically,  the' first years of the Common Market were marked by
mrlny achievernents, both in the fields of legislation and regulation and
in those of tlansfomation of production  structures  and the brorldening
of intra-Community  trade. After this came a period in. which the adoption
of decisions of immediate applicration, which had chalacterized the earlier
years, was largely superseded  lby declarations  of intent. ifhes': were
capable a priori of p,rodusir*  profound  changes in the economic  and social
,development c'f the Cornmunity, but they could not lnve any suctr effect
until they wele followed by concrete  decisions,  which were o,ften a long
time in comiqg. It is only during the last two 1's21t of so that we have
se(n a resumprLion o.f the forwarcl movement.
Why, then, has there been this temporary slaclcerring iin the Community's
activity? In the {iirst years the main concefn was to cleal away the
obrstacles which had been ceate,C artificially by the individual  countries
to hampet ttacte bet'ween the nations, whether in movements  of merchan-
dise, of capttal or of people,  and to moderate  some of the major differences
between the national provisions. Only one cornmon policy has really
been btought into ,operation; br.rt it is in fact the only one explicitly
ptovided for in the Treaty, and its formulation v'as made easir:r  br:cause,
on the Eurq>ean  conrtinent, all the countries  altea<ly operated intervention
practices in agriculture to a greiater or lesser extent, and these had an
66indisputable  family likeness. For the most part, the precise instructions
contained in the Treaty have been carried out. Though implementation
of some of them, such as the creation of a common capital market, has
lagged somervhat behind, others were put through in advance  of the time-
table, so that the end of the nitial gansition period could be o{fiaa1ly
recorded as 1 July 1968.
In the following yeafs, the task became much more difficult. The barriers
had indeed been thrown down, but it was now a question of working out
the common policies. A large economic arcahad been created  as a first
step, and the Community's  assignment  was to {ind a joint definition of
the objectives  of the nevr action to be taken.
The Treaty had provided means for this action, especially through
Article 235. In practice  these instruments have been used relatively  littie;
but this is not because no such action was contemplated, or through any
lack of concrete  proposals,  but more frequently because of the diffiarlty
of securing  agreement on what was to be done. This difficulty crops up
in various fields. It is found in the sectoral policies, such as enefgy policy,
research policy and structural poliry in industry. ft occurs again in the
more 'horizontal'  policies,  such as those aimed at income redisuibution ovef
the whole Community tenitory (social policy and tegional policy); and
again in defining the place the Community should occupy in the wotld
ar lafge (policy regarding developing  countries and international  monetary
policy). It woulJ be unduly simplifying matters  and incorrect to speak
of obstruction  of fesefvations  by any specific paftnet on a specific subject.
Admittedly, there has been a tendency for the differences of opinion
between the partners to assume bigger pfopoftions as new problems came
to be tackled; but fathef than deplore this fact, a mofe useful course is
to look for the cause.
The Treaty of Rome was based on a clea{y expressed vision of how the
economy would function L0 years ahead. The final condition subsisting
at the end of the lansition period was to be characterized  by the free
circulation  of goods, c^pital and people, with economic activity continuing
in an institutional framework of which the main lines were laid down in
the Treaty. This concept was influenced by the priority given to the
problems which were being faced 15 years ago, and by certain definite
e.onomic concepts. At that time the most urgent economic  problem was
the opening of the frontiers, a task on which GATT and the OEEC were
also working at a generul level, hence the accent was put on flee circula-
tion. At this time, too, the principal decision-making  centfes were national,
67hence the common rules set out in Title I in Part 'Ihree of the Treaty
--des on competition,  tax provisions and approxima.tion  of laws.
The years which followed saw profound changes in economic situations,
and therefore in the comparative  urgency of problems. The initial success
of the Common Market and thq raising of the standard of living led to
more discussion abr:ut the ultimate aims of the gro'*'th tharL about the
ways of obtaining it.  The operring-up  of the Community to the outside
world made the Ccmmunity both more sensitive to decisions;,  purblic or
private, taken outsiCle and more responsible regarding the world's economic
development.  The expansion c,f great multinational  cor.porations, with
th,ei1 lut*. financial dimensions, and their international strate€;ies in com-
merce and finance, drastically reduces the relative scope of decisions at
national level.
Tlrus, though the economic  concepts worked out in 7c)57 were ck:ar and
co.herent  enough to provide, for some years, sufficient guidancr: fol action
whenever  there was any uncertai:nty,  there was subsequently  a lack of any
sirnilar Grand Design to cover the next L0 or 15 years. The rCommunity
did not know towards what type: of society it wanted to work; it had no
overall long-term framework  intc, which it could fit each of the actrions it
contemplated and it could not see clearly what benefit couldl be drawn
from marching hand-in-hand  into a future which nobcdy had yet defined.
In such citcumstanr:es, it could not avoid a certain BaTkaniz,ation anda
dispersal of its action, as a result of which there was insufficient coherence,
both between  national and Comnrunity activities, and'between the 'uarious
act.ivities undertaken  by the Community itself. Adrnittedly there have
ber:n many proposa.ls, but to $ome extent they have been the more
nu:merous  beca.use the absence ol any clear vision of a long-tenn  ot,jective
prevented the day-to"day action p,riorities from being strictly di:fined.
Not that this phenomenon is peculiar to the Community;  all countries
exhibit an abs,ence of long-term  rstrategy. A stdking illustration  is to be
fotrnd in the vicissitudes of medium-term programming, both in co'untries
wlLich have been practising it for a quarter of a century and tlhose which
are) only now seeking to intoduce it.  This lack of cLear visic,n on long-
term developfirent is not confined to political institutions,  but can also
be seen in varying  clegrees in other institutions  inherently less subject to
contingencies,  such a;s the universities and the churches;. Paradoxical as it
may seem, it is in the multinartional  companies thzLt the tendency to
formulate and operate a long-term strategy appeafs trr be most nrarked.
It is paradoxical,  because the diffjculties of arguing  about a distant hLorizon
might seem all the flreater if the field of action is mc,re divers;e; but the
68paradox is only apparent, for this diversity of situations in different fields
and different countries in which the companies opexate opens tle way to
offset and compensation and introduces flexibility into the operation of
the strategy.
The Community institutions, too, have to carry out activities in a great va-
riety of fields and in different  countries. If they are to be able to work out
such a snategy, they will have to develop joint study of the great problems
of Europe L0 or 15 years ahead, and arrive at ptactical conclusions for both
national and C,ommunity action. It will then be possible to concenuate
more on the problems of tomorrow than on those of today, on oil policy
rather than coal policy, on industrial policy rather than agricultural po[g,
on the cteation of somethins new rather than the harmonization  of what
akeady  exists.
Technically speaking, the working out and implementation of such a
strategy presuptr)oses recourse to three Inslrumsnls-thinlcing  ahead,
medium-term  programrning and the procedures  of rutionalization  of bud-
getary choices (RBC ).  Forward thinking provides the medium-term pro-
gramme with the support which can enable it to define tle priorities
corfectly and steer the economy in the right direction at the right time.
The me&um-term programme  provides the general framework  for the
RBC which will make it possible to choose those programmes that are
best adapted for working towards the targets to which priority is given.
Conversely, if continued sterility is to be avoided, torward thinking must
lead to a genuine programme of medium-term action; and there would be
the risk that this would itsel{ remain academic if it were not given its
natural extension in the form of precise decisions and, where appropriate,
their reflection in the Budget. The three insttuments  must therefore be
applied simultaneously.
But the starting point remains the preparation  of a sufficiently  general
consensus  on the type of European society which it is proposed  ultimately
to create, i.e. its political, economic,  social and cultural aspects. To deter-
mine such a society,  contributions must come from the most widely dif-
fering quarters : from political citcles-particularly  the Eutopean  Parlia-
ment, trade unions-notably  international confederations, employers,
universities, and youth movements.  Some conffibutions  have already been
provided; it could be one of the aims of the Community Institutions to
elicit further and more precise contributions, and to draw practical conclu-
sions ftom them for concrete action, thus giving a second wind of creative
energy to the task of building Europe.
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